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NAVIGATING RESIDENTIAL
ATTORNEY APPROVALS: FINDING A
BETTER JUDICIAL NORTH STAR
DEBRA POGRUND STARK*

INTRODUCTION

Although attorneys have largely been excluded from the
residential real estate table in most states,' in several
jurisdictions, attorneys are still in the practice of representing a
home buyer or seller through the use of an "attorney approval"
clause.2 By including an attorney approval clause in a form
. Debra Pogrund Stark is a professor of law at The John Marshall Law
School. Professor Stark thanks Anastas Shkurti, J.D., The John Marshall
Law School, and Svetlana Kaplan, candidate for the J.D. degree at The John
Marshall Law School, for their excellent research assistance in connection
with this article. Professor Stark also thanks Patricia Mell, former Dean of
The John Marshall Law School, for her financial support of this article. Most
importantly, the author thanks her father, Sherwin Pogrund, for serving as
her muse on this article by recommending to her that she write an article on
this "crazy area of law that encourages bad faith" and for first suggesting to
her twenty years ago that she write articles on the interesting deals that she
encounters.
1. See Michael Braunstein, Structural Change and Inter-Professional
Competitive Advantage: An Example Drawn From Residential Real Estate
Conveyancing, 62 Mo. L. REV. 241, 260-61 (1997) (stating that in thirty-five of
the forty states responding to the 1992 survey conducted of the executive
directors and the general counsel of the Board of Realtors of all fifty states, the
real estate agent typically negotiates and drafts the contract of purchase and
sale without the aid or assistance of an attorney). "In these states, attorney
involvement is often limited to transactions in which no realtor is involved or
transactions that are unusually complicated, such as those involving contract
for deed or seller financing." Id. at 261-62.
2. Attorney approval clauses are used or discussed in the following eleven
states: California, see, e.g., Converse v. Fong, 205 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984); Colorado, see, e.g., Hein Enters., Ltd. v. San Francisco Real Estate
Investors, 720 P.2d 975 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Connecticut, see, e.g., Tavarozzi
v. Emmanuel, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 402 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 13, 2001)
(unreported opinion); Illinois, see, e.g., Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson,
Inc., 214 N.E.2d 771 (Ill. 1966); Louisiana, see, e.g., Stassi v. Gureasko, 120
So.2d 489 (La. 1960); Massachusetts, see, e.g., Smith v. Allmon, 461 N.E.2d
1237 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984); Minnesota, see, e.g., Nelson v. Nelson, 415 N.W.2d
694 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); New York, see, e.g., Duncan & Hill Realty, Inc. v.
Dep't of State, 405 N.Y.S.2d 339 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978); New Jersey, see, e.g.,
New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. New Jersey Ass'n of Realtor Bds., 461 A.2d
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contract that the broker fills in, brokers are able to have the buyer
and seller sign these contracts without any delays, and, in theory,
the parties are still able to have an attorney review the contract
and make sure that the contract and the deal the broker arranged
will in fact meet the client's expectations, goals, and needs.3
Unfortunately, this latter goal is not being met, partly due to the
problematic wording in some attorney approval clauses,' but
mainly due to the way courts have interpreted the clauses.5 This
Article contends that courts have misinterpreted contract
principles as applied to attorney approval clauses and that these
interpretations, on the one hand, encourage bad faith
terminations6 and, on the other hand, prevent attorneys from
competently representing a buyer or seller.7 In addition, by failing
to better articulate what constitutes "good faith" in this context,
these court rulings make it nearly impossible for an attorney to
know how to zealously represent her client while, at the same
time, complying with ethical requirements.'
In Part I, the Article traces the development of attorney
approval clauses and describes the court rulings on the
unauthorized practice of law that led to the development of these
clauses.
Part II describes how a well-trained attorney can protect
home buyers and sellers at the contract formation stage and
1112 (N.J. 1983); North Dakota, see, e.g., Davis v. Satrom, 383 N.W.2d 831
(N.D. 1986); and Ohio, see, e.g. Stevens v. Manchester, 714 N.E.2d 956 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1998).
3. See New Jersey Ass'n of Realtor Bds., 461 A.2d at 1114 (concluding that
the attorney review provisions and the courts' continuing supervisory control
will safeguard the public's interest from any overlap between the realty and
legal professions when a party signs a contract that a broker has filled).
4. See infra Part III.A. (discussing how many typical attorney approval
clauses contain problematic wording that defeats the purpose for which those
clauses were inserted in the contract in the first place).
5. See infra Part III.B. (discussing in general how several courts have
ruled on issues relating to attorney approval clauses in a way that has only
made matters worse).
6. See infra Part III.B.1. (discussing the negative consequences of
mischaracterizing attorney approval clauses as conditional acceptances rather
than conditional contracts); Part III.B.2. (discussing how the courts' failure to
adequately define "good faith" and require an attorney to specify the reasons
for disapproval also encourage bad faith disapprovals).
7. See infra Part III.B.1.e. (arguing that the case law in Illinois on the
nature of attorney approval clauses is clearly divided and that attorneys lack
the predictability they need in order to work with these clauses). Most
troubling, the majority of the reported decisions contain dicta that do not
accurately reflect the law, that create incentives for bad faith disapprovals,
and that prevent attorneys from competently and ethically doing their job. Id.
8. See infra Part III.B.3.a-e (analyzing five scenarios that attorneys have
or may in the future face and discussing on a compare-and-contrast basis what
the attorney would do under the current law, and what the attorney should
actually be doing, as a prelude to recommendations found in Part IV).

2006]

NavigatingResidential Attorney Approvals

173

thereafter far better than a broker, a title company, or a lender.
Understanding what a well-trained attorney would ordinarily do
when representing a party contemplating entering into a purchase
and sales contract is fundamental to analyzing whether attorney
approval clauses are serving their intended function.
In Part III, the Article argues that, to the extent that attorney
approval clauses were intended to provide buyers and sellers with
the means to be competently and legitimately represented by an
attorney, the typical wording of many attorney approval clauses
and certain court interpretations of the clauses have greatly
impeded this goal.
After critiquing the different wording
contained in attorney approval clauses, the Article identifies
instances of judicial misapplication of contract principles when
interpreting attorney approval clauses (mischaracterizing the
clauses as conditional acceptances and any proposed modifications
to the contract as counteroffers). The Article argues that such
mischaracterizations have opened the door to bad faith rejections
of a contract, and have impeded an attorney's ability to
competently and legitimately represent their client.
In addition, the Article contends that, although courts require
that attorneys act in good faith when exercising the attorney
approval clause, courts' failure to require that attorneys state the
reason(s) for their disapproval of the contract or to provide
proposed changes to the contract weakens the effectiveness of such
requirement and forces attorneys into real dilemmas when their
clients pressure them to improperly disapprove a contract. The
Article asserts that courts' failure to adequately define the "good
faith-bad faith" dichotomy forces many attorneys to make shot-inthe-dark type judgments on how to zealously represent their client
while properly exercising the attorney approval clause.
Finally, Part IV recommends that courts interpret these
attorney approval clauses in a fashion that better comports with
the public interest. It also recommends to associations of brokers
and bar associations of lawyers how to draft attorney approval
clauses in form residential purchase agreements to better serve
the purpose of such clauses. This section also advises attorneys on
how to fulfill their duty of zealous representation and, at the same
time, satisfy the good faith requirement when exercising an
attorney approval clause under current case law.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ATTORNEY APPROVAL CLAUSES

Notwithstanding the fact that a home typically represents the
single largest investment of an individual's savings,9 as well as a

9. John G. Steinkamp, A Case for Federal Transfer Taxation, 55 ARK. L.
REV. 1, 74 (2002)(citing Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Wealth Ownership,
1983-1998, 13, tbl.5 (Jerome Levy Econ. Inst. Working Paper No. 300, 2000),
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major source of personal comfort and security, most home
purchasers in America rely solely upon the seller's broker to
prepare the form purchase and sale contract. Yet, a buyer may not
realize that the purchase and sale contract creates the basic rights
and obligations of the parties with respect to the transaction and
that, typically, the broker's primary duties are to the seller rather
than the buyer.' ° By contrast, if that buyer hired an attorney to
counsel her with respect to the contract, the attorney would have a
duty to place the buyer's interests above the interests of all other
parties to the deal 1 and, presumably, an attorney would be better
trained than a real estate broker to spot potential problems with
the deal and to modify the deal as necessary to safeguard the
client's interests and to meet the client's expectations."
In
available at http://www.levy.org/docs/wrkpap/pdf/300.pdf).
Mr. Steinkamp
states that for most Americans, the principal residences are their largest
investment, constituting approximately 60% of all assets held by the middle
60% of households in 1998. Id. See also ABA Special Comm. on Residential
Real Estate Transactions, Residential Real Estate Transactions:The Lawyer's
Proper Role-Services-Compensation, 14 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 581, 591
(1979) (noting that "[t]o the buyer, at least, the purchase of a house may be the
most important legal and financial transaction of a lifetime" and "[blecause of
the complexity of property law, a 'minor' slip may cause great expense and
inconvenience").
10. Klawitter v. Billick, 242 N.W.2d 588, 592 (Minn. 1976).
11. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983) (setting forth the
duty of confidentiality), R. 1.7 (setting forth the duty to avoid conflicts of
interest and to place the client's interest ahead of the lawyer's interests), and
R. 1.15 (setting forth the duty to safe-keep property). See also Michael C.
Ksiazek, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Unauthorized
Practice of Law: Justification for Restricting Conveyancing to Attorneys, 37
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 169, 175-76 (2004) (citing various duties lawyers have to
their client under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
12. One empirical study has called into question whether enough attorneys
do, in fact, competently represent their clients in a residential deal. See Joyce
Palomar, The War Between Attorneys and Lay Conveyancers - Empirical
Evidence Says 'Cease Fire!', 31 CONN. L. REV. 423, 520 (1999) (suggesting that
the public does not bear a sufficient risk from lay provision of real estate
settlement services to warrant blanket prohibition of those services under the
auspices of preventing the unauthorized practice of law). One major limitation
with drawing conclusions from this data is that it focuses on the impact of
attorneys who are involved in the closing of a deal rather than in negotiating
the terms of the contract, and concludes that while there was some positive
impact, that impact was not statistically significant enough to require their
participation. See id. at 487-93 (describing the methodology and observed
samples of the survey). See also id. at 527 (suggesting that the practicing
bar's true motivation when insisting that only attorneys should be permitted
to draft instruments and close residential real estate transactions is
proprietary or self-protective in nature). The study did not include any data
on the impact of attorneys being involved in the negotiation of contracts, or
exercising their rights under an attorney approval clause in a signed contract.
See also id. at 485-93 (describing the methodology and observed samples of the
survey).
This author contends that because the basic rights and obligations of the
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addition, most buyers in America fail to hire an attorney to
represent them with respect to the important contingencies that
generally occur prior to closing (such as obtaining a physical
inspection of the home, obtaining a loan commitment, and
obtaining a title insurance commitment), again, typically relying
upon the seller's broker for assistance. In some cases, the buyer is
also unrepresented at the closing, relying instead upon the title
company with respect to title matters, the lender with respect to
the funds necessary to close, and the broker or seller's attorney to
make sure that the technical requirements necessary to close the
deal are accomplished.
Although courts in several jurisdictions have stated that,
theoretically, being represented by their own attorney would
better protect the interests of both the buyer and the seller, these
courts have resolved the issue of the unauthorized practice of law
in favor of allowing buyers and sellers to choose whether to seek
such representation, and have allowed brokers to fill in a standard
form purchase contract. 3 Some jurisdictions also allow brokers
and title companies to prepare the closing documents as well.14

parties are based upon the contract, the attorney can do the most good for her
client by being involved at that stage. See infra Part II and accompanying
notes (describing how a well-trained attorney can protect lawyers and sellers
at the contract-formation stage). Nevertheless, in light of the data collected in
Palomar, where lawyers could not identify specific problem areas, it appears
that few attorneys receive sufficient training to provide the type of competent
representation that parties should be able to count on, and this has
contributed to the diminishing role of attorneys in this practice area. See id.
at 515-20 (presenting findings of survey on complaints against attorneys). See
also, supra note 1, at 241, 247 (presenting the results of his own survey where
he found that many attorneys had difficulty specifying the hazards against
which their advice insured).
13. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 214 N.E.2d at 774; Pope County Bar Ass'n, Inc.
v. Suggs, 624 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Ark. 1981); New Jersey Ass'n of Realtor Bds.,
461 A.2d 1112 at 1115.
14. See Pope County Bar Ass'n, 624 S.W.2d at 829 (holding that in a
"simple" real estate transaction, warranty deeds, quitclaim deeds, release
deeds, and bills of sale may be filled out by a broker if the forms have been
approved by an attorney, parties to the transaction have declined to employ an
attorney, the broker makes no extra charge for preparation of the forms, the
broker gives no legal advice and uses the forms only in connection with the
transaction). The court adhered to the chancellor's definition of a "simple real
estate transaction":
[T]hose which involve a direct, present conveyance of a fee simple
absolute between parties, which becomes effective immediately upon
delivery of the title document. Such transactions do not include
conveyances involving reservations or provisions creating life estates,
limited or conditional estates, contingent or vested remainders, fee tails,
easements or right-of-way grants, or any other conveyance of future,
contingent or limited interest.
Id. See also In re Opinion No. 26 of the Comm. on the Unauthorized Practice
of Law, 654 A.2d 1344, 1348 (N.J. 1995) (holding that, under certain
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These courts identify four principle reasons to allow non-attorneys
to negotiate and document a residential real estate deal: it has
become customary for brokers to do this work in connection with
their work as a broker on residential deals; buyers and sellers
should have a freedom of choice; allowing non-lawyers to perform
these functions will lead to an anticipated cost savings; and,
perhaps most importantly, a lack of data that buyers or sellers are
in fact harmed when they have not hired an attorney. 5 National
conditions, brokers may conduct closing settlements without the presence of
an attorney). By requiring that the attorneys involved in drafting the closing
documents refrain from playing a role in drafting or approving the purchase
and sale contracts, courts are basically closing the barn door after letting out
the horses. As discussed in Part I, infra, the most important role the attorney
plays is negotiating the terms of the contract that create the rights and
obligations of the parties. For example, if the contract calls for a quitclaim
deed, it does the buyers little good to have an attorney represent them at
closing to review the deed, since the buyers will only be entitled to a quitclaim
deed; at this stage, the attorney cannot insist upon a general warranty deed.
Florida, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, and Washington outright prohibit
non-attorneys from being involved in drafting closing documents. See, e.g.,
Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n, 46 So.2d 605, 606 (Fla. 1950) (holding
that the filling in of blank deeds and the like by a real-estate broker
constituted the practice of law); Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So.2d
818, 820 (Fla. 1954) (echoing that real estate brokers practiced law by
completing standard conveyance forms, such as deeds, mortgages, and
satisfactions); Collacott Realty, Inc. v Homuth, 13 Ohio Ops. 250, 28 Ohio L.
Abs. 211 (Mun. Ohio 1939) (holding that a real-estate agent or broker cannot
prepare contracts, deeds, mortgages, land contracts, leases, etc., nor can he fill
in appropriate blanks for these items, even when no charge is made therefore,
and the only interest that the real-estate broker has is consummating a deal
in which he was involved as a broker, as these acts constitute the practice of
law); Oregon State Bar v. Security Escrows, Inc., 377 P.2d 334, 339-40 (Or.
1962) (holding that informed or trained discretion must be exercised in
selection or drafting of document to meet needs of persons being served, that
the practice of law includes drafting or selection of documents and giving of
advice in regard thereto, but that practice of law excludes filling in of blanks
under direction of customer upon form or forms selected by customer); State v.
Buyers Service Co., 357 S.E.2d 15, 17-19 (S.C. 1987) (holding that forms useful
for conveyancing, preparing documents affecting title, handling real estate
and mortgage closings, and even transporting or mailing documents to the
county recorder's office as part of real estate transfer, all fell within the realm
of the attorney's task, and that a non-attorney's performance of these acts
constituted the unauthorized practice of law); Doe v. McMaster, 585 S.E.2d
773, 777-78 (S.C. 2003) (reaffirming Buyers Service Company and holding
that an independent attorney must properly supervise all of the steps of the
transaction and be physically present at the closing); Washington State Bar
Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 251 P.2d 619 (Wa. 1952) (holding that a
non-attorney invaded the practice of law when he prepared four deeds - three
simple in form and one containing a mortgage clause - by completing printed
forms or statutory warranty deeds supplied by a title insurance company).
15. See In re Opinion No.26, 654 A.2d 1344 at 1346 (reasoning that the
South New Jersey practice of conducting closings without attorneys shows
that there is no demonstrable harm to buyers and sellers, and that such
practice saves money).
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broker associations have fought hard and successfully to exclude
attorneys from the residential real estate table because they
perceive lawyers, at best, as deal delayers and nit pickers and, at
worst, as deal killers. 16
Twenty years ago, New Jersey attempted to strike a balance
in the war between brokers and lawyers over handling residential
real estate deals. It allowed brokers to fill in the blanks of a
standard form purchase and sale contract so long as the contract
contained an "attorney approval" clause which would permit either
party a three-day period to rescind the deal based upon their
attorney's review of the contract. " In addition to New Jersey, the
practice of including an attorney approval clause or a clause that
allows the attorney to propose modifications to the contract has
spread to several other states. 8 Courts favor such clauses because
they allow, but do not force, a buyer or seller to hire an attorney,
and because it is hoped that if an attorney is hired, that attorney,
through the exercise of the attorney approval clause, can protect a
buyer or seller in a fashion similar to the case where the party
hired the attorney before entering the contract. Even brokers
have an incentive to use form contracts that include attorney
approval clauses because they reduce the likelihood that the
brokers will be successfully sued for negligence when they serve
the functions that attorneys typically perform.19 Also, brokers can
16. See Trenta v. Gay, 468 A.2d 737, 738 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1983)

(acknowledging that brokers fear that the doubts that afflict people entering
substantial transactions may unravel perfectly good deals while the lawyers
pick nits); Brokers to the Brokers, REGISTERED REP., at 6 (June, 2002) ("Not
many houses would sell if [buyers] had attorneys and CPAs in the process too
early."). See also PETER BIRNBAUM, MANAGING REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
IN THE NINETIES, 407 PRACTICING L. INST. REAL EST. L. & PRAC. COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 685, 688-89 (1994). ("Brokers frequently see lawyers as
the only thing between themselves and their commission, and this tension
alone is enough to make the two professions natural adversaries.").
17. New Jersey Ass'n of Realtor Bds., 461 A.2d 1112 at 1115 (conditioning
brokers' right to fill out contracts on inclusion of a conspicuous clause making
the contract subject to review by an attorney within three business days).
18. Attorney approval clauses are used or discussed in the following eleven
states: California, see, e.g., Converse, 205 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984);
Colorado, see, e.g., Hein Enters., Ltd., 720 P.2d 975 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985);
Connecticut, see, e.g., Tavarozzi, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 402; Illinois, see,
e.g., Quinlan & Tyson Inc., 214 N.E.2d 771; Louisiana, see, e.g., Stassi, 120
So.2d 489; Massachusetts, see, e.g., Smith, 461 N.E.2d 1237; Minnesota, see,
e.g., Nelson, 415 N.W.2d 694; New York, see, e.g., Duncan & Hill Realty Inc.,
405 N.Y.S.2d 339; New Jersey, see, e.g., New Jersey Ass'n of Realtor Bds., 461
A.2d 1112; North Dakota, see, e.g., Davis, 383 N.W.2d 831 at 832-33; and Ohio,
see, e.g. Stevens, 714 N.E.2d 956.
19. Pope County Bar Ass'n, 624 S.W. 2d at 831 (Hickman, J., concurring)
(warning realtors, who sought and gained the right "to practice law," to be
aware that their negligence in preparing such legal documents may well be
examined by applying a standard of care expected of attorneys and that, with
this convenience, comes a heavy responsibility to the public).
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assure a reluctant buyer or seller that the contract they will sign
will be subject to an attorney's review and approval. Attorneys in
many states have acquiesced in this compromise since they would
prefer to join the dinner party a bit late and enjoy a "half loaf'2 0
rather than be completely excluded from the deal table altogether.
Unfortunately, courts have, at times, misinterpreted the attorney
approval clauses and have confused the attorneys who seek to
competently and ethically represent their clients under those
clauses.
II. WHAT A COMPETENT AND WELL TRAINED LAWYER WOULD
REPRESENTING A HOME BUYER OR HOME SELLER

DO IF

When I teach a law school course on real estate law, we cover
not only the relevant laws, but also a "transactional skills"
framework that all transactional lawyers should follow." Under
this framework, attorneys should follow four essential steps when
reviewing a contract that their client is considering entering into.
Most of the points raised within this framework relate to the
buyer's attorney, as there are more risks and special issues for the
home buyer than the home seller. At the end of this section,
however, I will separately address the recommended course of
action for a competent and well trained seller's attorney.
A. Four Essential Steps That Buyer's Attorney Should Follow
When Reviewing the Contract
1.

Find out the buyer's goals, expectations, special needs, and

plans

As the first step in the transactional skills framework, the
buyer's attorney should inquire about the client's goals and
expectations, what promises have been made to the client about
the property, what special needs or future plans the client has
regarding the property, and, ultimately, make certain that all of
these expectations, needs, and plans will be met through their
incorporation into the contract as conditions, covenants, and/or

20. See Stephen E. Alloy, Real Estate Contractsand Approval Clauses, CHI.

DAILY L. BULLETIN, Mar. 20, 1995, at 6 (arguing that since attorneys get to
review a contract only after it is signed, their role is limited: within just a few
business days an attorney must either approve the contract or make
modifications that would inevitably put the client at risk of losing the deal).
Mr. Alloy states that "the opportunity to modify a contract on behalf of a
client ... is half a loaf-better than no opportunity to modify but not as good as
being involved in the negotiation." Id.
21. See generally DEBRA POGRUND STARK, ET AL., COMMERCIAL REAL
ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: A PROJECT AND SKILLS ORIENTED APPROACH (Lexis
Publishing 3d ed.) (2001); DEBRA POGRUND STARK, RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE
LAW: A TRANSACTIONAL SKILLS ANALYSIS (Carolina Academic Press) (2004).
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representations and warranties. For example, if, after closing, the
buyer plans to attach a garage to the eastern portion of the house,
the attorney should add to the contract, as a condition to closing,
that the buyer obtain from the city a building permit, and that the
location of such addition will comply with any governmental or
privately created set-back requirements or other restrictions that
encumber the property. Even the best form purchase contracts
(i.e. ones that are comprehensive and balanced between the buyer
and the seller rather than favoring one over the other) will not
contain any provisions relating to a client's special plans or needs.
It is the attorney's job to discover such plans and needs during the
attorney approval period, and to make sure that the contract
provides related protections.
Another example related to ensuring that the client's
reasonable expectations are met arises in the common situation
where the seller or the seller's broker has made one or more oral
promises or representations to the buyer that the buyer relied
upon when she signed the purchase contract. Often many such
oral promises ("Oh, don't worry, we will address that water stain
issue at the walk-through stage! " '2 or, "Don't worry about getting a
loan, the seller will provide you a loan!"23) are not added to the
form contract by the brokers. If the promises are not kept or if,
after closing, the buyer discovers that the representations turn out

22. Woods v. Pence, 708 N.E. 2d 563, 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). In that case,
the sellers' realtors told the buyers who questioned about water stains in the
walls that the issue would be addressed at the final walk-through prior to
closing, but no walk-through occurred. Id. Even if such walk through did
occur, it would not necessarily protect the buyers. Most form contracts state
that the buyer has the right to inspect the property forty-eight hours prior to
closing and that it is a condition to closing that the property is in the same
condition as on the date the contract was signed. This does not adequately
protect the buyer from the potential problem that the roof is defective and in
need of repair or replacement since that is the condition of the roof at the time
the buyer signed the contract. More often than not, if the buyer were to tell
the attorney about the water stain conversation, the attorney would then
check to make sure that there is a physical inspection contingency in the
contract, which occurs within a few days of the signing of the contract, to make
sure it provides for the ability of the buyer to rescind the deal if the inspection
detects a defect, or perhaps to provide at the buyer's option for the seller to
repair the defect prior to closing or to get an adjustment to the purchase price
to reflect the estimated costs for the repair or replacement. If these provisions
are not present in the contract, the attorney should propose revisions to the
contract to contain such conditions and covenants.
23. Moore v. Doyle, 85 Pa. Super. 406, 408-10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1925). In that
case, the buyer and the seller orally agreed that the seller would provide a
mortgage to the buyer. The seller's broker filled out the contract, but left a
few spaces blank, telling the buyer that the spaces could not be filled at that
time and that the contract will reflect all the terms of the oral agreement.
However, the final contract did not include the mortgage provision.
Subsequently, the seller refused to provide the mortgage. Id.
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to be untrue, the buyer's expectations will not be met and the
buyer's remaining option will be an expensive and uncertain fraud
claim to obtain damages. It is up to the attorney to find out from
the buyer if the seller or broker made any representation that
influenced the buyer to agree to the purchase, and to turn any
important promises into covenants if not already provided for in
the contract.
2.

Determine what can go wrong with this deal and how to fix it

The second step in the transactional skills framework at the
contract formation stage is to attempt to ascertain potential
problems arising from the way in which the deal has been
structured, the terms in the proposed contract, or any other facts
that the client tells the attorney. Then, when possible, the
attorney should draft modifications to the contract containing the
necessary combination of conditions, covenants, representations,
and warranties or indemnifications that address these risks in a
comprehensive fashion. For example, if the client is buying a
condominium unit in a building not yet constructed, many form
contracts used by builders and developers provide only an
estimated date for when construction will be substantially
completed, saying that closing will occur when substantial
completion occurs and that the seller will not be in default if the
building is not completed by the estimated date. As a result of this
clause, even if it is now one year past the estimated date of
completion, the seller would not be in default and the buyer would
be unlikely to successfully sue the seller for the buyer's damages,
or even be able to get her earnest money back.
Even when the buyer successfully sues the seller, many form
contracts limit the buyer's remedies when the seller defaults solely
to the return of the earnest money deposit. If, three months after
the seller and the buyer enter into a contract containing such
limitation, the seller finds a new buyer who is willing to pay more
for the same property, the seller can refuse to sell to the buyer and
will be liable only for the return of the buyer's earnest money."
24. In general, courts will enforce the bargain that the parties strike on any
matter, including remedies upon default, unless the bargain struck is deemed
unconscionable. One exception to this is when the parties agree to a liquidated
damages clause, in which case, the court will more closely scrutinize what has
been agreed to. See Grossinger Motorcorp, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
607 N.E.2d 1337, 1347 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that the liquidated
damages provision in the contract was unenforceable and that the nonbreaching seller was allowed to recover only actual damages). Liquidated
damages clauses in a real estate contract will be valid when: '(1) the parties
intended to agree in advance to the settlement of damages that might arise
from the breach; (2) the amount of liquidated damages was reasonable at the
time of contracting, bearing some relation to the damages which might be
sustained; and (3) actual damages would be uncertain in amount and difficult
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Most form contracts that builders and developers use are lengthy
and few buyers actually read the terms of the contracts that they
sign. This reinforces the buyer's need for an attorney to explain
these risks and, as step four discusses below, to try to reduce these
risks by negotiating for changes to the contract. Even if the
attorney is unable to induce the seller to modify the contract (this
is especially a possibility when it is a "seller's market") the buyer
has been well served by the attorney alerting her to these risks
and it will allow her to make an informed decision on whether to
accept or terminate the deal.
3. Know local law
The third fundamental step taken by a competent attorney
under the transactional skills framework at the contract formation
stage is to become familiar with the customary terms for a deal of
this nature and the location of the property, and to make sure that
the contract complies with their client's interests. For example, if
it is customary for the seller to pay for title insurance, then, as the
buyer's attorney, you would want to ensure that the contract
reflects this custom, especially when the form provides various
options for certain terms or for the filling in of certain blanks.
4. Negotiate effectively on behalf of your client
The fourth and final step in the transactional skills
framework represents the pinnacle of the attorney's involvement
at the contract formation stage. Here, the attorney should adeptly
negotiate for and draft modifications to the form contract so as to
create the necessary conditions, covenants, and representations
and warranties to meet the client's expectations and needs as
described above. Before negotiating for any changes, the attorney
should become familiar with what rights and obligations the client
would have under case law and any relevant statutes if the
contract is silent. Also, the attorney should understand how the
contract might be adding to or taking away from those rights and
obligations. This is especially important when, due to market
conditions, either the seller or the buyer can exercise more
negotiating power. In such circumstances, raising an issue that
you want clarified or handled a certain way can backfire and lead
to the contract being revised in a way that is adverse to the client's
interests.
A good example of the interplay between protections under
existing law and the need to negotiate for additional protections

to prove." Id. at 1346. If the parties agreed that in the event of the seller's
default the buyer's sole remedy is return of the buyer's earnest money, this
basically provides for rescission and restitution and may not be viewed by a
court to be an unconscionable term in a contract.
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arises in the context of a buyer that is purchasing a condominium
unit rather than a detached single family home. Due to the
common areas shared among owners in a condominium building
and the close proximity of each owner to the other, condominium
developments are subject to a declaration of covenants and
restrictions on use. Because the declaration can create highly
burdensome financial obligations and restrictions on use, several
states have created statutory protections for purchasers of
condominium units, including the right to receive certain
condominium documentation (the declaration, the bylaws for the
condominium association, the rules and regulations, etc.). In
Illinois, for example, upon written request, the seller is required to
provide these documents to the buyer.25 Of course, what good does
it do the buyer to receive these documents if they do not have the
right to approve them as a condition to closing? That issue arose
in the case of Nikolopulos v. Balourdos26 where the buyer learned
that there would be a large special assessment to pay for window
replacement throughout the entire building. The court ruled that
there is an implied right to rescind a purchase under the Illinois
Condominium Property Act ("ICPA") when the provided
condominium documents reflect a substantial financial burden
that would be imposed on the buyer as a new owner. 7
Yet, both ICPA and Nikolopulos v.Balourdos allow gaps in
the protections provided to condominium buyers. For example, it
is up to the buyer to initially request these documents, and a
buyer might not ask for them, or might receive them from a broker
who does not encourage the buyer to carefully read them. Second,
the case only addresses the situation where a substantial financial
obligation is disclosed in the condominium documents. It does not
address a right to rescission if any other matter revealed in the
condominium documents is objectionable to the buyer, such as the
presence of use restrictions that interfere with the buyer's
intended uses of the property, like restrictions on the ability to

25. Illinois Condominium Property Act, Resale; Inspection by Purchaser,
765 I.L.C.S. § 605/22.1 (2005) (requiring an officer of a condominium
association other than developer to provide such information within thirty
days of a written request in cases of condominium re-sales).
26. Nikolopulos v. Balourdos, 614 N.E.2d 412, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). The
condominium financial statement revealed that the windows of the building
had to be replaced at a cost of $2,750,000 and that the work would be
performed over a period of five to seven years. Id.
27. Id. The court found that implied in the right to review is the right to
terminate the contract within a reasonable time after being furnished
information revealing previously undisclosed material expenses. The cost of
replacing the windows directly impacted upon the buyer's financial burden if
he were to purchase the unit. This previously undisclosed condition allowed
the buyer to terminate the contract and entitled him to the return of his
earnest money plus interest accrued. Id.
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lease out the unit or to keep a pet in the unit. It is up to the
attorney during the negotiation of the contract or the attorney
approval period to require the receipt of these documents, to
condition the closing upon buyer's approval of all the provided
documents, and to bargain for the buyer's right to rescind if these
documents reveal not only financial obligations but use
restrictions or any other matters that are unacceptable to the
buyer.
B. Beyond The FourEssential Steps: Ensure That The Buyer's
ContractRights And ProtectionsAre Enforced.
When a buyer hires an attorney pursuant to the attorney
approval clause, not only should the buyer receive the kind of
advice and representation described above, but the lawyer should
also determine whether the conditions to closing have been
satisfied. As previously mentioned, there are three common
conditions to closing: a satisfactory physical inspection of the
property, a satisfactory loan commitment, and a satisfactory title
commitment. Although it is the terms of the contract that create
these conditions (or modify them in the case of the implied
covenant of marketable title) and the basis for the right to rescind
under them, it is the buyer's attorney who will review the
inspection report, the loan commitment, and the title commitment
to determine whether the right to rescind exists. The attorney will
review the physical inspection report to ensure that the property
has no major physical defects, or if it does, determine with the
client whether to rescind or adjust the purchase price, or make
provision for the seller to repair the defects before closing. The
attorney will also review the loan commitment that the buyer
receives to determine whether the lender has unconditionally
agreed to make the loan promised to the borrower (i.e. no
conditions that are not within the control of the buyer). The
attorney may also advise the buyer on whether the loan is
overpriced or one that the borrower can afford to pay." Finally,
the attorney will review the title commitment and survey to detect
whether they reveal any encumbrances on title to the property
which are currently violated, financially burdensome, or that
would interfere with the buyer's intended uses of the property.
1.

Inspection of title matters before and during closing
In particular, a lawyer is in the best position to review the

28. See generally Debra Pogrund Stark, Unmasking the Predatory Loan in
Sheep's Clothing: A Legislative Proposal, 21 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J.
129 (2005) (pointing to the increase in the number of predatory loans in the
residential real estate industry and proposing a mortgage counseling
intervention law).
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title commitment to determine if it adequately protects the buyer's
expectation
of good
title not subject to unacceptable
encumbrances. Mere receipt of a title commitment provides little
protection to a home buyer because the title company can raise in
Schedule B to the commitment a myriad of third party interests
that encumber the insured property, such as mechanic liens,
unpaid and delinquent real estate taxes, easements, restrictive
covenants that impair the buyer's use of the property, and even
defects with seller's title to the property. If these exceptions are
raised in Schedule B to the title commitment, the title company is
not insuring any losses that the buyer or other insured party
experiences after closing due to the listed exceptions. Very few
buyers who have not been represented by competent attorneys are
aware of this29 and, thus, do not know that it is in the buyer's
interest to have the title company "insure" over these risks (i.e.
commit to reimburse the buyer for any losses the buyer
experiences due to these encumbrances), or to rescind the deal due
to their existence. In addition, a competent lawyer will know the
boilerplate terms in a standard title insurance policy and the fact
that without "extended coverage" over the general title exceptions,
the title policy would not cover many important potential title
problems such as encroachments of improvements, rights of
tenants under unrecorded leases, and inchoate mechanic lien
claims (lien claims not yet of record but that could arise for work
commenced within a certain period that have not been paid for in
full).
When problems or disputes arise between the parties
regarding these contingencies or any other matter, it is the
attorney's job to know the client's rights based upon the contract
signed, along with any relevant case law or statutes, and to
negotiate a resolution favorable to the client in light of these
rights. Even a buyer's broker (a broker hired by the buyer rather
than the seller) rarely takes on this role on behalf of a buyer in a
dispute with the seller, and a seller's broker certainly would not
and could not due to their duty of loyalty to their principal. If this
dispute arises prior to closing and the buyer is not represented by
an attorney, the likely result is the deal will close with the buyer
inadequately protected. °
29. See, Braunstein supra note 1, at 260 (presenting research results that
indicates that title insurers have been so successful at advertising their
services, that consumers generally perceive the title insurance to give them

more protection than it actually does).
30. See, e.g., Trenta, 468 A.2d 737 (affirming dismissal of the buyers'
complaint for specific performance). In Trenta, unrepresented buyers signed a

form real estate contract that the seller's broker filled. Then, the sellers found
an attorney who disapproved the contract without disclosing a reason). See
also Stevens, 714 N.E.2d at 959-60 (reversing judgment of the trial court for
the buyers and holding that the sellers' attorney could withhold approval if the
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2. Variations in the transactionalskills framework from the
seller'spoint of view
Although a seller's attorney would follow a similar
transactional skills framework at the contract formation stage, the
major issues that typically concern a seller are more limited in
nature than those of the buyer. There are two key concerns that
the seller's attorney must address at the contract formation stage:
(1) making it more certain that the closing will occur (which
requires a careful review of the conditions to closing to make sure
that none are likely not to be satisfied and to provide the seller
with adequate remedies in the event that the buyer defaults and
fails to close) and (2) making sure that the seller is not exposing
herself to undesirable potential liability in connection with the
sale through reviewing the accuracy of any representations or
warranties under the contract with the client, reviewing any
covenants under the contract with the seller to ensure that the
seller can perform them, and reviewing the remedies section of the
contract to make sure that the seller's liability is minimal or nonexistent for matters outside of the seller's control, such as a mere
right of rescission and restitution rather than a right to damages
or specific performance which might include equitable adjustments
to the purchase price. In addition, the seller's attorney will work
with all of the other real estate professionals in satisfying the
conditions to closing and in documenting the closing of the deal as
required by law.
III. THE CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION POSED BY
TYPICAL ATTORNEY APPROVAL CLAUSES AND How COURTS HAVE
MADE A TOUGH SITUATION EVEN WORSE

It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the wisdom of
using an attorney approval clause as compared with requiring an
attorney to negotiate and draft the contract. Others have already
addressed this issue quite well, pointing out, among other things,
the terrible time constraints that the attorney must operate in
(usually just a day or two) and the psychological difficulty an
attorney faces with proposing changes to a deal after it has
already been negotiated and signed, as well as the constraints
posed on what the attorney can actually do based upon the
wording of the approval clause.31 However, these criticisms are
attorney considered the project economically unreasonable for his client).
31. See Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Attorney Approval Clauses in Residential
Real Estate Contracts-Is Half a Loaf Better Than None? 48 KAN. L. REV. 339
(2000) (citing Harold I. Levine, Avoiding Malpractice-Attorney Approval,
ATT'ys TITLE GuAR. FUND, INC., at 2 (1986)). Mr. Levine argued that such
time frames are outrageous:
Broker, seller and buyer can spend weeks or months negotiating a deal,
but the lawyer has 72 hours to review the contract and be charged with
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still relevant to this article since they shed light on drafting and
interpretation issues with respect to attorney approval clauses
which have become the norm in several jurisdictions.
A.

Typical Attorney Approval Clauses Contain Problematic
Language - Case Studies From New Jersey And Illinois.

1. New Jersey
New Jersey 2 is the only state that requires that a residential
sales contract contains an "attorney approval" clause. However, it
is useful to begin by analyzing the New Jersey language because
courts and practitioners outside of New Jersey have been
influenced by this language and the rationale behind it. The
following language is required in New Jersey at the top of the first
page of the contract:
THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT THAT WILL
BECOME FINAL WITHIN THREE BUSINESS DAYS. DURING
THIS PERIOD YOU MAY CHOOSE TO CONSULT AN
ATTORNEY WHO CAN REVIEW AND CANCEL THE
CONTRACT. SEE SECTION ON ATTORNEY REVIEW FOR
DETAILS.n
The rationale behind this broad language (note there is no
exclusion for rejecting a contract based upon the purchase price, a
limitation common in many form contracts with attorney approval
clauses outside of New Jersey) is that the clause is intended to
allow the buyer and seller a three day escape clause during which
the contract may be disapproved "at the unfettered discretion of
that party's attorney."34 New Jersey courts have interpreted the
clause to allow the attorney to disapprove the contract during the
attorney review for "any reason," including that the seller has
received a higher offer, without explanation.35
the responsibility. Those of us who labor in the valleys of the law will
tell you that the lawyer usually gets the contract in the last 24-36 hours.
Id. Mr. Levine also found the procedural requirements "onerous." See id.
(noting that one rider in Illinois commonly used "requires service on specific
parties at specific times, and there are whole areas such as pricing, closing,
[and] possession, which cannot be negotiated"). Another major problem
attorneys face when they work on a residential deal is the low fees that
attorneys in the market can charge for what could become a highly time
consuming matter.
32. In New Jersey, a settlement agreement following the case of New Jersey
State Bar Ass'n v. New Jersey Ass'n of Realtor Bds., on the unauthorized
practice of law led to certain prescribed attorney approval language being
attached to each form residential real estate purchase and sale agreement.
461 A.2d at 1115.
33. Id.
34. Denesevich v. Moran, 211 N.J. Super. 554, 556 (App. Div. 1986)
35. See, e.g., Trenta, 191 N.J. Super. 617; Indoe v. Dwyer, 424 A.2d 456, 458
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However, based upon the analysis of what a well-trained and
competent attorney would do for her client at the contract
formation stage, the clause is both over-inclusive and underinclusive. It is over-inclusive because it contains no express
limitations on the basis by which an attorney would disapprove a
contract.36 For example, if we were to apply normal contract
principles of interpretation, most home buyers or sellers would be
surprised to find out after they signed a contract subject to
"attorney" approval that the buyer or seller could now get out of
the deal because either party has changed her mind on the agreed
purchase price. However, court decisions in New Jersey would
allow this." Lawyers typically do not advise their clients on the
purchase price for a deal and, consequently, most parties would
not expect that the other party could rescind the deal based upon
this factor under an attorney approval clause. In addition, it is
even possible in New Jersey that a court would find that an
attorney approval clause was not exercised in bad faith when a
client directs the attorney to reject the contract because the client
has simply changed her mind on doing the deal at all (i.e.,
unrelated to any advice that the attorney provides to the client), or
because she has now found a better deal (again unrelated to any
advice that the attorney has provided relating to the contract),
since the court characterizes the attorney approval clause as akin
to an absolute right of rescission."
Rejection of the contract for any of these reasons should not
be permitted under the attorney approval clause because it is not
only inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of buyers and
sellers (unless brokers are telling the parties that this is basically
a three-day right of rescission unrelated to attorney advice), but it
is also inconsistent with permitting rejections based upon the
advice that a competent attorney would give to her client when the
contract was first formed (the purpose of requiring the clause in
the first place). If the clause is truly a simple three-day right of
rescission, unrelated to attorney advice, then the clause should
more clearly state that so the parties will be better informed about
what they have signed. Even if the clause was more clearly
drafted to reflect that there is basically a three-day rescission
period, it is still not good policy for attorney involvement to run

(N.J. Super. Ct. 1980)
36. There is a case law created requirement of "good faith" that would limit
how an attorney can exercise the attorney approval, but in light of the broad
basis that New Jersey courts have construed the attorney's right to

disapprove, it is hard to fathom on what basis disapproval would qualify as
"bad faith."
37. Carmagnola v. Hann, 559 A.2d 478, 481 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.

1989).
38. Id.
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along these lines. When the clause is interpreted, in essence, as
an absolute three-day right of rescission, it is being interpreted in
an under-inclusive fashion in terms of meeting the goal of putting
the client in the position they would have been in had they been
represented by an attorney during the formation of the contract.
As Part I discusses above, effective lawyering includes not only
spotting problems, but resolving them as well, so that the deal can
proceed in a revised fashion that meets a client's goals and
expectations. The attorney approval clause language in New
Jersey, which only permits an attorney to approve or disapprove
the contract and does not include the right to make recommended
changes to the contract, seriously impedes the normal negotiation
functions that adequately trained and competent lawyers would
perform for their clients.
2. Illinois
Although there is no requirement in Illinois that all
residential purchase and sale agreements filled in by a broker
must contain an attorney approval clause, it is a widespread
practice in Illinois (and the practice in ten other states based upon
reported decisions in those states) that residential purchase and
sales contract contain some type of attorney approval clause, and
the reported decisions in Illinois, and elsewhere, reflect certain
basic similarities in how they are drafted with some important
variations. 9 This section will critique the different types of
attorney approval clauses used in Illinois in light of the goal of
allowing the creation of a binding contract to reflect the meeting of
the minds that the broker has facilitated, while at the same time
allowing the parties the opportunity to have the same kind of
representation as they would have had (or as close to it as
possible) if the attorney had been consulted before the deal was
signed.
a. VERSION ONE: Approval As To Form, Requiring Notice Of
Approval - At issue in the case of Denis F. McKennna Co. v.
Smith .4o
This contract is contingent upon the approval hereofas to form by the
39. Attorney approval clauses are used or discussed in the following eleven
states: California, see, e.g., Converse, 205 Cal. Rptr. 242; Colorado, see, e.g.,
Hein Enters., 720 P.2d 975; Connecticut, see, e.g., Tavarozzi, 2001 Conn.
Super. Ct. LEXIS 402; Illinois, see, e.g., Quinlan & Tyson Inc., 214 N.E.2d 771;
Louisiana, see, e.g., Stassi, 120 So.2d 489; Massachusetts, see, e.g., Smith, 461
N.E.2d 1237; Minnesota, see, e.g., Nelson, 415 N.W.2d 694; New York, see, e.g.,
Duncan & Hill Realty Inc., 405 N.Y.S.2d 339; New Jersey, see, e.g., New Jersey
Ass'n of Realtor Bds., 461 A.2d 1112; North Dakota, see, e.g., Davis, 383
N.W.2d 831; and Ohio, see, e.g. Stevens, 714 N.E.2d 956.
40. 704 N.E.2d 826, 828 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
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attorneys for Purchaserand Seller within 5 (five) business days after
Seller's acceptance of this contract. Notices shall be given pursuant to
Paragraph14 on the reverse side hereof

There are several problems with the way this clause is
It could be
worded. First, the word "form" is problematic.
misinterpreted to literally mean a problem with the form of the
contract, rather than substance of the contract, but this
misinterpretation has not been adopted in any reported decision
reviewed. Second, there are no specific exclusions as to matters
that cannot serve as the basis for an attorney not to approve the
contract, such as purchase price or receipt of a better offer after
the seller or buyer had already signed the contract. As previously
discussed, the purchase price is not a matter that a competent and
well-trained attorney would advise a client on. Third, as a
procedural matter, it would make more sense to require the
attorney to put a notice of disapproval in writing rather than
require a notice of approval within the five-day time frame in
order to avoid an unintended voiding of the contract. Fourth, and
perhaps most importantly, the clause fails to provide the attorney
with the opportunity to propose changes to the contract rather
than merely approve or disapprove it. As previously discussed
with respect to New Jersey's clause, this severely limits the
attorney's role to spotting problems and killing the deal, rather
than also solving the problem, by negotiating for modifications to
the contract to cure the identified potential problems or otherwise
meet the client's special needs and objectives. A fifth final critique
is that the attorney is not required to specify a reason for
disapproval and there is no requirement that the reason asserted
be reasonable. This last critique will be fully addressed in the
discussion of version four below.
b. VERSION TWO: Approval As To Form, Requiring Notice Of
Disapproval - At issue in the case of Hubble v. O'Connor."
This contract is contingent upon the approval hereof as to form by the
attorney(s) for Buyer and Seller within 5 (five) Business days after
Seller's acceptance of this contract. Unless written notice of
disapprovalis given within the time period specified above, then this
contingency shall be deemed waived and this contract will remain in
full force and effect. If written notice of disapproval is given within
the time period specified above, this contract shall be null and void
and the earnestmoney shall be returned to the Purchaser.

All of the points raised with respect to Version One hold true
for Version Two except that Version Two contains a better
procedure for exercise of the clause for the reasons stated above.

41. 684 N.E.2d 816, 819 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
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c. VERSION THREE: Attorney review and modification of the
contract, excluding price, requiring notice of disagreement on
changes - at issue in the case of Olympic Restaurant Corporation
v. Bank of Wheaton."2
Attorney Review: The parties agree that their respective attorneys
may review and make modifications, other than stated purchase
price, mutually acceptable to the parties, within ten (10) business
days after the date of the Contract acceptance. If the parties do not

agree and written notice thereofis given to the otherparty within the
time specified, then this contact will become null and void, and all
monies paid by the Purchaserwill be refunded. IN THE ABSENCE
OF WRITTEN NOTICE WITHIN THE TIME SPECIFIED
HEREIN, THIS PROVISION WILL BE DEEMED WAIVED BY ALL
PARTIES HERETO AND THIS CONTRACT WILL BE IN FULL
FORCEAND EFFECT.
Version Three is preferable to Versions One and Two because
it does not contain the approval limitation "as to form," it permits
attorney modification of the contract, it contains an explicit
limitation against modification of the purchase price (and by
requiring modification of the contract will make it much more
difficult for either party to be able to get out of the deal based upon
receiving a subsequent better offer), and it procedurally requires
notice of disagreement over any proposed modifications.
Nevertheless, Version Three has several problems. Perhaps the
most important problem with the clause is one of its strengths: it
requires the attorney to make modifications to the contract rather
than be empowered to simply disapprove the contract. While in
most situations, after spotting problems with the contract or the
deal, an attorney can modify the contract to eliminate or reduce
the problems, there are times when problems cannot be solved
with a simple modification of the contract.
For example, as discussed in Part I, in today's marketplace, a
lawyer should also provide advice to a prospective home buyer as
to whether the loan necessary to close the deal is one that is
prudent for the buyer to enter into. If it turns out that, in order to
close, a condominium buyer will need to enter into a loan where
more than forty percent of the buyer's gross monthly income must
go towards monthly payments of principal, interest, taxes, and
condominium assessments, then the attorney should be able to
counsel the buyer that the purchase of a home at that price at this
time is not financially prudent. If the buyer then decides to take
that advice, the buyer would want to be able to rescind the deal
through the attorney exercising the attorney approval clause, but
could not do so if the clause only permits the attorney to either
approve the contract or make changes to the contract other than
42. 622 N.E.2d 904, 906 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993).
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purchase price. A more efficient way to address the problem that
some parties will use the attorney approval clause to get out of a
deal that they already signed because they receive an offer with
more favorable financial terms during the attorney approval
phase, is to draft the contract to expressly prohibit such conduct
and to require the attorney to specify the reason(s) for disapproval,
which the attorney and client believe in good faith are not curable
by modification to the contract.
d. VERSION FouR: Attorney approval or modification of the
contract, excluding price and dates,' requiring notice of
disagreement on changes and requiring reasonable disapproval At issue in the case of Groshek v. Frainey.
It is agreed by and between the parties hereto as follows: That their
respective attorneys may approve or make modifications, other than
price and dates, mutually acceptable to the parties.Approval will not
be unreasonablywithheld, but if within [five business] days after the
date of acceptance of the Contract, it becomes evident agreement

cannot be reached by the parties hereto, and written notice thereof is
given to either party within the time specified, then this Contract
shall become null and void, and all monies paid by the Purchaser
shall be refunded.

Version Four is similar to Version Three in that it allows
attorney modification of the contract, but it is unclear whether the
attorney is allowed to simply disapprove the contract. The clause
in Version Four reads "approval or modification" and fails to also
state "or disapproval." Later, the clause refers to "approval" not
being withheld unreasonably (i.e. contemplating the possibility of
disapproval), but it is unclear whether the "disapproval" being
referred to is disapproval of the contract or disapproval of
proposed modifications to the contract. In contrast, The MultiBoard Residential Real Estate Contract 3.0 form is an example of
a form contract containing an attorney approval clause that makes
it very clear that the attorney can approve, disapprove, or make
modifications to the contract."
43. The Attorney-Approval Rider of the Chicago Association of Realtors
residential real estate form contract contains language substantially similar to
Version Three except that it also included as a forbidden change the broker's
compensation and dates. See Helen W. Gunnarsson, Attorney - Approval
Clauses and Residential Real Esate Contracts:Mere Modification or More? 93
ILL. B.J. 72, 74 (2005) (reproducing pertinent parts of that contract).
44. 654 N.E.2d 467, 469 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
45. See Gunnarsson, supra note 43, at 74 (explaining the difference in the
attorney approval provisions between these two commonly used form contracts
in Illinois). The attorney review clause created by the Multi-Board Residential
Real Estate Contract 3.0 is far more clear on this issue and provides:
ATTORNEY REVIEW: The respective attorneys for the Parties may
approve, disapprove, or make modifications to this Contract, other than
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A second problem with Version Four is the inclusion of the
limitation on changing the dates in a contract. Why should an
attorney be unable to propose or require this change for approval
of the contract? For example, if the contract only allows a buyer
ten days to obtain a loan commitment and in the attorney's
judgment this is too short a time period, the attorney should be
able to require this change to better protect the buyer's ability to
have the funds on hand necessary to close the deal and an
adequate time period to obtain a loan commitment before having
to rescind the contract. What if the closing date is a month short
of the two year holding period for exemption from federal taxes?
Under this clause the seller's attorney could not disapprove or
require modification of the closing date to protect the seller from
incurring preventable taxes.
A third problem with the clause is that, although the clause
states that the "approval" shall not be unreasonably withheld, the
clause should also have stated that the attorney disapproving
must provide the reason(s) for such disapproval to better
effectuate the goal of preventing an "unreasonable" disapproval.
The question of whether overall it is beneficial to require that the
disapproval be "reasonable" is a close call. On the positive side,
requiring that the approval of the contract and the modifications
to the contract not be unreasonably withheld should help to
prevent "bad faith" disapprovals by the parties through their
attorneys. On the other hand, a problem with requiring that the
approval not be withheld "unreasonably" is that a third party (the
other attorney and, if the issue goes to litigation, a jury or court of
law) will be deciding whether the attorney's articulated reasons for
disapproval is reasonable. This adds more uncertainty to the
exercise of attorney approvals and the possibility that the
attorney's good faith judgment will be challenged. Currently, in
all jurisdictions that have interpreted attorney approval clauses,
courts have required that the attorney exercise the clause in "good
faith." It is difficult to define "good faith" and "bad faith" in any
context, including this one. Yet, one way of doing so is to ask
whether the disapproval is based upon the attorney's review of the
contract and the attorney's determination after consultation with
the client that the contract does not meet with the client's needs,
stated Purchase Price, within five (5) business days after the Date of
Acceptance. Disapproval or modification of this Contract shall not be
based solely upon stated Purchase Price. Any notice of disapproval or
proposed modification(s) by any Party shall be in writing. If within ten
(10) business days after Date of Acceptance written agreement on
proposed modification(s) cannot be reached by the Parties, this Contract
shall be null and void and earnest money refunded to Buyer upon
written direction of the Parties to Escrowee. If written notice is not
served within the time specified, this provision shall be deemed waived
by the Parties and this Contact shall remain in full force and effect.
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goals, and expectations when the client entered into the contract,
or that the contract poses problems that cannot be cured through
modification of the contract. A contract clause requiring that the
exercise be "reasonable" will impose a higher standard. The issue
of whether it is better to require good faith or to require the
disapproval to be reasonable will be addressed in Part IV. Finally,
a potential problem arises with regard to revealing confidential
information in the process of specifying the reasons for the
disapproval.'

46. The reported decisions in Illinois have not yet ruled on the issue of
whether an attorney may reveal confidential information accumulated during
the representation of his client, despite the attorney-client privilege, to the
extent that the information is necessary to show that the disapproval of the
contract pursuant to the attorney approval clause was made in good faith.
This is an important issue, because in most of the discussed cases, the
attorneys for the disapproving parties have had to testify regarding the
negotiation process between the parties. See e.g., McKenna, 704 N.E.2d at 829
(providing parts of the deposition and testimony of the buyer's attorney
regarding the transaction at issue); Whitlock v. Labadie, No. 73AP-461, 1974
Ohio App. LEXIS 3501, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974) (holding that the seller had
waived the attorney-client privilege when the seller called the counsel that
disapproved the contract pursuant to the attorney approval clause to the
stand, and posed questions concerning the exercise of good faith in the giving
of advice to the seller, and that the buyer had the right to cross-examine the
seller's counsel concerning the exercise of good faith).
The absence of much case law on whether an attorney may reveal such
confidential information can be partly credited to both Olympic Restaurant
and McKenna, which held that "[wihile the review clause must be invoked in
good faith, it is not necessary for a party to state a reason when rejecting a
contract pursuant to a review clause because the attorney's right to disapprove
is a proper exercise of his or her judgment." McKenna, 704 N.E. 2d at 829,
quoting Olympic Restaurant v. Bank of Wheaton, 622 N.E.2d 904, 909 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993).
In addition, the Supreme Court of Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct permit, but do not require, an attorney to use or reveal
confidential information necessary to defend against accusations of wrongful
conduct. ILL. SUP. CT. R. PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.6 (2005).
If the non-disapproving party wants to force the attorney for the
disapproving party to reveal specifics about the decision to disapprove the
contract in the face of a challenge based on privilege, one way to do so would
be to show that the disapproval falls within the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING

LAWYERS § 82 (2000) (providing that the attorney-client privilege does not
apply to a communication occurring when a client: (a) consults a lawyer for the
purpose, later accomplished, of obtaining assistance to engage in a crime or
fraud or aiding a third person to do so, or (b) regardless of the client's purpose
at the time of the consultation, uses the lawyer's advice or other services to
engage in or assist in a crime or fraud). Comment f explains that the
exception becomes relevant only after the attorney-client privilege is
successfully invoked and the person seeking access to the communication must
present a prima facie case for the exception. Id. at § 82, cmt. F. Fraud
requires a knowing or reckless misrepresentation (or non-disclosure when
applicable law requires disclosure) likely to injure another. Id. at § 82, cmt. d.
Hence, the courts must decide whether crime or fraud allegations should
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B. How Courts Have Made A Tough Situation Even Worse
Several decisions from Illinois and other jurisdictions have
characterized the presence of an attorney approval clause as a
conditional acceptance and an attorney's proposed changes to the
contract as counteroffers."'
This characterization allows either
party to then claim that there was no binding contract to begin
with, and consequently, no requirement for a good faith
termination of the contract. If the attorney approval clause in the
contract had been characterized as creating a conditional contract
or a condition subsequent (as many other conditions contained in
a standard form contract are, such as the condition that the buyer
obtains a specified type of loan commitment), then there would be
a binding contract subject to good faith performance of the
condition.
1. The Negative Consequences of MischaracterizingAttorney
Approval Clauses as ConditionalAcceptances Rather Than
Conditional Contracts
In a few rare cases, characterizing the attorney approval
clause as a conditional acceptance and any proposed changes as a
counteroffer would be accurate,' but in most other cases, the
characterization is in fact incorrect49 and can lead to bad faith
terminations of contracts. When a party, such as the buyer, signs
a contract and the seller does not sign the contract in the form
signed by the buyer, but instead adds to or otherwise changes the
terms of the form contract signed by the buyer, this constitutes a

be the only instances when the exception to the attorney-client privilege will
apply in the context of good-faith disapprovals of the contracts, or whether
such exception will apply to other circumstances that impose lesser proof
burdens on claimants. So far, the attorney's own judgment will decide not
only whether to disapprove a contract pursuant to the attorney approval
clause, but also whether she can fend away any accusations of "bad faith"
disapproval by revealing confidences of her client. See also infra, note 149 and
accompanying text (discussing how the procedural decision of which party will
have the burden of proving good faith will potentially affect the issue of
disclosing confidential information). As explained later in the article on what
is good faith, if the client directs an attorney to disapprove for an
impermissible reason, the attorney obviously should not disapprove the
contract and will then not have to reveal a confidential discussion with her
client.
47. Groshek, 654 N.E.2d at 470; McKenna, 704 N.E.2d at 829.
48. Davis, 383 N.W.2d at 833 (finding conditional acceptance and a
counteroffer where a seller accepted a buyer's offer to buy a mobile home, but
added a number of new terms including an attorney approval clause);
Converse, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 245-46 (finding conditional acceptance where a
buyer accepted an offer, but included a provision stipulating that the offer was
subject to her obtaining an approval from an attorney, an accountant, and her
son).
49. Groshek, 654 N.E.2d at 470; McKenna, 704 N.E.2d at 829.
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conditional acceptance of the contract and the new or changed
terms are a counter offer.5 ° Thus, if an attorney approval clause is
added to the contract by the seller after the buyer has already
signed the contract without such clause, this change would cause
the seller's acceptance of the contract to be a conditional
acceptance and causes the contract to not be binding in any
fashion.
If, however, a form contract contains an attorney
approval clause, and both parties sign the contract with this
clause already in it, and the parties do not unilaterally add to or
otherwise change the terms of the contract, the contract is now
valid and binding subject to the condition that both parties'
attorneys have a right to approve the contract, which the parties
through their attorneys must exercise in accordance with the
terms in the attorney approval clause and in good faith.
Unfortunately, there are certain cases in Illinois and in some
other states where courts have characterized an attorney approval
clause in the originally signed contract as a conditional
acceptance, reasoning that when a party merely proposed changes
to the contract under this clause, such action constituted a
counteroffer that invalidated the contract. 1
In trying to
understand how Illinois courts have mixed up conditional
acceptances with conditional contracts (whether as a condition
precedent or a condition subsequent), a close reading of the case of
Anand v. Marple" is in order since it is one of the first published
cases that involved an attorney approval clause and the issue of
conditional acceptance; and, although that case was correctly
decided, it has been cited to incorrectly by several Illinois courts.
a. Anand v. Marple - The misunderstood case
In Anand, the form contract was very badly drafted. The
contract contained no legal description and the parties unilaterally
added terms to the contract, which in some cases contained
indecipherable words. The buyer signed the contract first. 3 Three
days later, the seller signed the contract and checked a box
indicating that she had made a counteroffer.' The next day, the
buyer signed a handwritten statement at the bottom of the
contract that stated "Buyer countered 1-23-87 at 7:20 pm." 5 The
50. Davis, 383 N.W.2d at 833 ("In order to form a contract ...there must
be an unqualified and absolute acceptance of an offer by either party. [Any]
modification of the terms of a proposal, made in response to a proposal,
changes the terms of the original proposal, the modification is a new proposal
or counter offer."). Id.
51. Groshek, 654 N.E. 2d at 470. See also Stevens, 714 N.E.2d at 959;
Converse, 159 Cal. App. 3d at 91.
52. Anand v. Marple, 522 N.E.2d 281 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
53. Id. at 282.
54. Id.
55. Id.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[39:171

bottom of the contract contained two other handwritten sentences.
The first stated "Both seller's and buyer's attorney's [sic] will
complete terms and conditions of sale."" The second sentence
stated "This offer is subject to seller's [indecipherable words]. " "
The seller's attorney sent a letter to the buyer's attorney
confirming a prior conversation in which the seller's attorney
indicated that the contract contained a seller's attorney approval
clause and that the attorney now disapproved and rejected it, that
the terms and conditions they had discussed were not acceptable,
and that the seller was not interested in further negotiations.'
The court correctly stated that in the suit by the buyer for
specific performance of the purported contract, the key issue was
whether the disputed document was a valid, enforceable contract
or merely preliminary negotiation.59 Because the seller in Anand
did not simply sign the contract that was signed by the buyer, but
inserted a handwritten change, such conduct gave rise to the issue
of conditional acceptance. The buyer then signed the contract a
second time with a notation that the buyer "countered" at a
specific date and time. In such instances, when a buyer or seller
fails to sign a contract in the form signed by the other party and
instead adds to or otherwise changes the terms of a contract that
the other party has signed, the issue of conditional acceptance is a
proper consideration for the court. Hence, the court correctly
pointed out:
[Tihe [seller] signed the document on January 22 when she
presented her counteroffer, but she did not sign it again after the
[buyer] countered on January 23. It is elementary that for a
contract to exist there must be an offer and acceptance, and the
acceptance must comply strictly with the terms of the offer. A
conditional acceptance or one which introduces new terms that vary
from those offered constitutes a rejection of the original offer and
becomes a counterproposal which must be accepted by the original
offeror before a valid contract is formed. In this case, there was an
original offer and two counteroffers, but there is no indication of
mutual assent to any or all of the terms contained in the document. 60
Thus, it was not the presence of the attorney approval clause
that made the court conclude that there was no offer and
acceptance in Anand, but rather the failure of the parties to agree
to all of the counteroffers that occurred in that case. Indeed, the
court characterized the "subject to attorney [indecipherable word]"
to indicate "that the document was subject to some unknown,

56. Id.
57. Id.

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 282-83 (internal citation omitted).
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illegible, and indecipherable condition subsequent."' It also made
sense for the court to discuss whether a valid and binding contract
was created because the form contract lacked a legal description
and the "subject to attorney" language added to the contract did
not refer to the attorney's approval as a condition to closing, but
instead referred to the terms of the deal being completed by the
attorneys for both parties. Finally, it is also noteworthy that in
the case of Loeb v. Gray, cited by the court on the issue of
conditional acceptance, the seller never signed the original
contract, but only the listing agreement and an addendum to the
contract that contained terms different from those of the contract
that the buyer signed.62 In both Loeb and Anand, the courts ruled
that there was never a binding contract because there was never
offer and acceptance by the parties in those cases, not because
there was an attorney approval clause in the original form
contracts that the parties signed.
Unfortunately, some Illinois courts have cited Anand as the
basis for ruling that the presence of an attorney approval clause
creates a conditional acceptance or that proposed changes under it
constitute a counter offer, even when the clause in those cases was
in the original form contract signed by both parties.'
The first
such recorded case to cite Anand in this incorrect fashion was
Olympic Restaurant Corporation v. Bank of Wheaton,' decided in
1993 by the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District. Like
Anand, Olympic Restaurant is a case that reached the correct
result,' but that contained some incorrect dicta that unfortunately
has been applied by other Illinois courts in even more harmful
ways which have impeded the basic goal behind the presence of
attorney approval clauses.
b. Olympic RestaurantCorporationv. Bank of Wheaton - When
dicta overshadows the holding
In Olympic Restaurant, the printed form contract contained
an attorney review clause authorizing the parties' attorneys to
review and make modifications, other than stated purchase price,
mutually acceptable to the parties and stating that if the parties
did not agree (presumably to these required changes) and written

61. Id. at 283.
62. Loeb v. Gray, 475 N.E.2d 1342, 1348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) ("[A] new term
was introduced, namely, the disposition of the proceeds of an oil and gas
production. That term was never accepted; hence, no contract was formed.").
63. Olympic Restaurant Corp., 622 N.E.2d at 908; Groshek, 654 N.E.2d at
470; McKenna, 704 N.E.2d at 829.
64. Olympic Restaurant,622 N.E.2d at 904.
65. One could argue, however, that the court was incorrect on the notice
issue. See supra, note 59 (discussing how the court chose to consider the two
letters of December 7th as notice of disagreement).
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notice thereof was given to the other party (presumably of such
failure to agree to such required changes) within ten days, the
contact would become null and void. 6 On November 7, 1991, the
attorney for the sellers sent a letter to the buyer and his lawyer,
stating that the attorney did not "approve" the contract and thus
was enclosing his modifications and/or changes. That same day,
the buyer's attorney wrote back that certain changes to the
contract "should" be made and further stated that, "With regard to
Seller's attorney approval letter dated November 7, 1991, I
disagree with the following modifications and/or changes...."
There was no further correspondence between the parties until
November 11, 1991, when the seller's attorney sent a letter to the
buyer stating "My clients advise that they do not wish to accept
your counter offer [sic] of November 7, 1991, and thus have
authorized the return of your earnest money deposit. They thus
consider this matter to be closed."
The attorney for the buyer, operating under the attorney
review clause, had clearly required that certain changes be made
to the contract, as did the attorney for the seller. The two
attorneys failed to agree on the required changes and both the
trial and appellate courts ruled that such failure "nullified" the
contract (a term consistent with the valid creation of a contract
that has now become null and void through an unfulfilled
condition). 7 This result (and this portion of the terminology for
the result) was correct. The case on one level was a relatively easy
case to resolve (except, perhaps for a procedural question on the
exercise of the notice of disapproval and the issue of good faith).'
There was a contract, the contract was subject to a condition that
the parties' lawyers have the right to review and require changes
to the contract that if not agreed upon would make the contract
null and void, and the parties each required certain changes which
were not agreed to, and therefore, the contract became null and
void.
However, certain dicta from this case are wrong and have
caused problems for Illinois lawyers in the proper exercise
attorney approval rights. "9 Both the trial and the appellate courts
66. See supra, Part I, b. VERSION THREE.
67. Olympic Restaurant,622 N.E.2d at 908.
68. One could argue that neither party properly notified the other within
the required time frame that they had not agreed to the other's proposed
changes. See id. at 906 (summarizing how neither side accepted the other's
modifications, and that the only other correspondence presented in the record
was a letter from the sellers' attorney to the buyers dated three days after the
ten day review period had expired). The court, however, relied upon the
November 7th letters as the basis for the required notification of
disagreement. Id. at 910.
69. See Gunnarsson, supra note 43 (presenting an overview of the
disagreement between several prominent residential real estate attorneys in

20061

NavigatingResidentialAttorney Approvals

incorrectly referred to the letters as "counteroffers." The appellate
court cited to Loeb v. Gray for the rule of law that when an
acceptance requests modification or contains terms that vary from
those offered, this constitutes rejection of the original offer and
becomes a counterproposal that must be accepted by the original
offeror before a valid contract is formed. But, as previously
discussed, in Loeb, the seller had never signed the purchase
contract in the form that the buyer had, and the seller had
inserted new and different terms into the contract. Loeb does not
stand for the proposition that a requested change to a contract
under an attorney review clause which was in the original printed
form contract that the parties had signed constitutes a
counteroffer.
The Olympic Restaurant court also misapplied
Anand by stating that the presence of the hard-to-read attorney
approval clause in that case was what caused the contract to fall
short of a binding and enforceable contract. 70
As previously
discussed, a series of other facts caused the court to rule that no
binding contract had ever been created in that case.'
The consequence of concluding that the attorney review
clause creates a conditional
acceptance or calling the
communications made pursuant to the clause a counteroffer is that
there is no longer a requirement that the disapproval under the
clause be in good faith. As the court in Olympic Restaurant stated
after discussing whether the sellers had acted in good faith or not
(the court stated in dicta that there was a question of bad faith
here on the part of the sellers since the seller signed a contract
with another buyer for a higher purchase price during the review
period), "[we have] concluded, and we agree, that the November 7
the Chicago area as to the impact of an attorney approval clause in a purchase
and sale agreement). Mr. Steven Bashaw, who authors the Real Estate Flash
Points for the Illinois ICLE, points to the Olympic rationale and terminology
to claim that a proposal for modification under the attorney approval provision
constitutes a rejection of the contract and a counteroffer to form a new
contract. Id. at 74.
Mr. John O'Brien, chair of the Illinois Real Estate Lawyers Association,
agrees with Mr. Bashaw, evoking the common law 'mirror image' rule, and the
language of the Multi-Board Residential Real Estate Contract 3.0. Id. Indeed,
both Mr. Bashaw and Mr. O'Brien agree that the increasingly common
practice in Illinois of adding to a requested change the statement "The
foregoing is not to be construed as a counteroffer" is not effective and that the
suggested change will still be construed as a counteroffer. Id.
However, Mr. Ben Cohen, another Chicago attorney, disagrees with both
Messrs. Bashaw and O'Brien. "I don't see how a proposal for modification does
anything but put talk into the air" and points to the Attorney Approval Rider

prepared by the Chicago Bar Association's Real Property Law Committee,
which recognizes that a valid contract exists, regardless of whether the
attorney for either party serves to the other a suggestion for modification. Id.
70. Olympic Restaurant, 622 N.E.2d at 908-09.
71. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text (discussing how the court
chose to consider the two letters of December 7th as notice of disagreement).
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letter written by [the buyer's attorney] was by itself a rejection of
the original contract and a counteroffer. Thus, regardless of the
[seller's] apparent bad faith, [the buyers] disapproved the October
25 agreement and made a counteroffer that was never accepted."
If the buyer had not so clearly required certain changes to be made
to the contract in the November 7 letter and had merely suggested
certain changes, then the issue of the seller's bad faith in
exercising its attorney review right would have been an
appropriate inquiry, but one that the court still might not have
recognized because of the court's mischaracterization of both
letters as counteroffers. This means that there was no binding
contract in the first place, and thus, no requirement of good faith
exercise of the approval right.
c. Groshek v. Frainey - The amplification of Olympic
Restaurant'smischaracterization
In 1995, the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court for the
First District, Second Division in the Groshek v. Frainey" case
illustrated the points made above. The Groshek court cited both
Anand and Olympic Restaurant, as well as a treatise on contract
law, 3 to characterize the presence of an attorney approval clause
in a form contract signed by both parties as a conditional
acceptance rather than a conditional contract. The Groshek case,
however, is more troubling than Olympic Restaurant because the
court went even further by clearly stating in dicta that even
proposed modifications (as compared to modifications that the
sellers' attorney required in Olympic Restaurant) under an
attorney approval clause constitute a counteroffer, citing to
Olympic Restaurantand Anand for support.74
The Groshek dicta put a lawyer in a terrible bind. If the
lawyer sees certain problems with the contract that the attorney
and the client would like to address through revising the contract,
if possible, (rather than as a deal-breaker point) they take a big
risk if they propose or suggest a change to the contract that will
allow the other side to get out of the deal without forwarding any
good faith basis. Relying on dicta from Groshek and Olympic
Restaurant, the other party can simply say that the lawyer's
requested changes to the contract constitute a counteroffer which

72. Groshek, 654 N.E.2d at 467.
73. The court in Groshek cited to RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON
CONTRACT § 6:13, 104-18 (4th ed. 1991) for the proposition that "conditional
acceptance occurs when a party to an agreement imposes as a condition of the

bargain the favorable opinion of his lawyer." But the cases cited in the footnote
for support of this proposition, where the facts of the cases are discussed,
involve examples of the unilateral imposition of an attorney approval right.
74. Groshek, 654 N.E.2d at 471.
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they decline to accept, and thus, there is no binding contract. 5
Such dicta create a "straight-jacket" that impedes the attorney's
ability to adequately represent her client. On the one hand,
attorneys would like to use their knowledge and skills to
competently represent the client. This would include identifying
potential problems with the way the deal is currently documented
and structured and solving these problems in a fashion acceptable
to both parties. On the other hand, attorneys fear that their
actions will lead to a bad faith termination of the contract that
courts will allow to occur.
The mischaracterization of suggested changes in the context
of an attorney approval clause as a counteroffer also encourages
parties to use the counteroffer dicta to terminate a contract in bad
faith. A party would only argue the counteroffer point with
respect to a recommended change if they now have a better deal to
pursue, or if they simply changed their mind on selling altogether
for reasons unrelated to an attorney's advice. If the other side was
not trying to get out of the deal in bad faith and they really did not
like the recommended change, they could simply say "No" to it and
have the contract continue without this change. This is because
the party proposing the change was only asking, not demanding,
that these changes be made in the hopes of convincing the other
party to agree if they did not really object to the change or to
bargain over it during the negotiation of other changes. This is
part of the give and take of negotiating a deal and problem solving
rather than simply killing a deal upon detection of a potential
problem. If one party, after consultation with the attorney, voiced
true objections to the contract that could not be fixed through
revision to the contract, they could write a letter to the other side
disapproving the contract. But, when the real reason why they do
not want to proceed with the deal is that they now have a better
offer, they can latch onto the dicta in these two cases to, in
essence, terminate the contract in bad faith.
d. Hubble v. O'Connor- The Illinois court that correctly
characterizes attorney approval clauses and proposed
recommendations under it.
There is one ray of hope, however, and it came from the
Illinois Appellate Court for the First District, Sixth Division, in
75. It is upon this rationale that Messrs. Bashaw and O'Brien claim that
attorney approval provisions operate as counteroffers that terminate the
contract the parties have already signed. See discussion supra, note 69.
According to them, the end result of Olympic, Groshek, and the attorney
approval provisions modeled after the Multi-Board Residential Real Estate
Contract 3.0 is that when an attorney proposes a modification to the contract,
even if it is just moving the closing date by one day, it's a counteroffer and
could result in killing the deal. Gunnarsson, supra note 43, at 74.
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6
the 1997 case, Hubble v. O'Connor."
The Hubble court correctly
characterized the attorney approval clause contained in the form
contract signed by the buyer and the seller as creating a condition
subsequent to a binding contract, since the clause was in the
buyers' original offer and that offer was accepted by the seller."
The court concluded that the parties entered into a valid contract
when they signed the agreement. It then addressed whether the
parties' subsequent discussions concerning the proposed rider to
the contract constituted an implied disapproval of the contract
under the attorney approval clause. The court ruled that in
analyzing the legal significance of the discussions of the parties'
attorneys under the attorney approval clause, the mirror image
rule is not relevant because this was not a case of contract
formation. "A counteroffer rejects an offer only when made before
a contract is formed. Here, the contract was formed when
defendants' offer was accepted by plaintiffs on June 8, 1993.""8
Consequently, the only question was whether one of the attorneys
had disapproved the contract within the stated disapproval period.
The Hubble court also ruled that if an attorney merely
proposes changes to a contract under an attorney approval clause
requiring notice of disapproval for termination (Version 2 in Part
I), this will not lead to a termination of the contract.79 To hold
otherwise would be fundamentally unfair because it would "allow
one party to give ambiguous disapproval so as to play both sides of
the fence, i.e., to argue that a binding contract exists or that no
contract exists, depending upon the development of subsequent
events."0
The court concluded that neither the seller nor the buyer's
attorney had timely disapproved the contract. The first letter from
the buyers' attorney referred to a "proposed" rider which,
according to the court, merely requested changes to what was, at
that time, a binding agreement. After most of the requested
changes had been agreed to and memorialized in the rider, the
buyer's attorney, on the last day of the attorney disapproval
period, sent a letter proposing a final change. "I would like to
propose a final additional provision to the Rider ... I would like to
add a provision which. . . ." The court concluded that this letter
hardly constituted "disapproval" of the agreement. The court in
Hubble correctly distinguished its facts from the facts in both
Olympic Restaurant and Groshek as to whether the attorney
letters constituted disapproval of the contract:

76. Hubble v. O'Connor, 684 N.E.2d 816 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
77. Id. at 821.

78. Id.
79. Id. at 822.

80. Id.
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In Olympic, the sellers' attorney wrote a letter to purchasers'
attorney within the disapproval period and stated 'I do not approve
said contract.'.. .That same day, purchasers' attorney wrote to
sellers' attorney: '... please be advised the following modifications
should be made to the Contract'. . . . [Tihese letters were fair notice
by and to each party of the other's intention to invoke the attorney
disapproval.... See also Groshek v. Frainey... where attorney
unambiguously wrote within the disapproval period, 'I hereby
withhold my approval of said contract.'
By contrast, the buyers' attorney in Hubble failed to clarify
that they intended to disapprove the contract. Indeed, it appears
that the buyers changed their mind only after expiration of the
attorney approval period because one of the buyers discovered that
he had a business opportunity to relocate from Chicago to
Budapest, Hungary, and due to this subsequent development, the
buyers attempted to invalidate the contract or argue that they had
in fact disapproved the contract.8
e. Despite Hubble, Illinois attorneys cannot predict whether
courts will still follow the flawed reasoning of Olympic Restaurant
and Groshek.
Unlike the courts in Olympic Restaurant and Groshek, the
court in Hubble not only had it right in terms of the result in the
case, but the court's rationale was on sound footing in terms of
both the analysis of the law and the policy concerns that seek to
discourage bad faith terminations. The problem persists, however,
because there is inconsistent case law in Illinois on construing
attorney approval clauses and attorneys encounter difficulty in
predicting how a court will construe this issue if it were to arise
again."
One would like to think that courts would follow the
reasoning of the Hubble case rather than that of the Olympic
Restaurant and Groshek decisions. Yet, the dicta from the Illinois
Appellate Court for the First District, First Division in 1998 in
Dennis F. McKenna Co. v. Smith" still cited to Groshek to support
the following inaccurate statement of law: "If a contract with an
attorney approval clause is accepted before an attorney's approval,
the acceptance is construed as a qualified or conditional

81. Id. at 822-25
82. Hubble v. O'Connor, 684 N.E.2d at 821, points out this inconsistency.
The case stands for the proposition that when two parties sign a purchase and
sale agreement containing an attorney approval clause, a binding contract is
formed subject only to a condition subsequent. Id. In support, the Hubble
court cited a well known treatise standing for the rule of law that "an offer
that states that it is 'subject' to the approval of the attorneys of both parties
creates a contract the moment it is accepted." 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS, § 3.7, 336 (Rev. Ed. West Pub. Co.) (1993).
83. McKenna, 704 N.E.2d at 829.
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acceptance of the terms of the contract."' Notwithstanding that
statement, the issue in the McKenna case according to the court
was whether the seller's attorney exercised the right to disapprove
the contract in good faith. This is strange, because if the clause
truly created a conditional acceptance, then there was no contract
formed, and thus, there should be no obligation to act in good faith
when exercising a right of disapproval under the clause. The court
ruled that the seller's attorney had in fact exercised the clause in
good faith, even though the seller received and accepted a higher
offer from another purchaser during the attorney approval
period,' a result that will be addressed below in Part IV.B.2, in
the discussion of courts' problems with distinguishing good faith
from bad faith attorney contract disapprovals.
Hence, Illinois case law on the nature of an attorney approval
clause is clearly divided and attorneys lack the predictability they
need to know how to work with these clauses. Most troubling, the
majority of the reported decisions contain dicta that do not
accurately reflect the law, that create incentives for bad faith
disapprovals, and that prevent attorneys from competently and
ethically doing their job. Other jurisdictions also suffer from this
problem, with some courts incorrectly interpreting these clauses
and others correctly doing so."
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 830. The court basically accepted the seller's attorney's testimony
that the reason for the disapproval was the fact that the buyer insisted that
the contract state that the offer from the buyer was only good for three hours
and that the disapproval was not based upon the other offer at a higher
purchase price. Id.
87. For cases that hold that attorney approval clauses in a contract signed
by both parties are counteroffers or create conditional acceptance of the
purchase and sale agreement, see, e.g., McKenna, 704 N.E.2d at 829 (holding
that if a contract with an attorney approval clause is accepted before an
attorney's approval, the acceptance is construed as a qualified or conditional
acceptance of the terms of the contract)(citing Groshek, 654 N.E.2d at 467;
Converse, 159 Cal. App.3d at 91 (concluding that the signing of the deposit
receipt did not constitute an unqualified acceptance of the plaintiffs' offer, but
was only a conditional acceptance); Pelusio v. Chen, 787 N.Y.S.2d 679 (N.Y.
Supp. 2003) (holding that when the contract language makes the agreement
subject to the approval of attorneys, then the contract is not binding and
enforceable until approved)). The case of Davis v. Satrom, 383 N.W.2d 831,
833 (N.D. 1986) is distinguishable, because the Davis court properly held that
the seller's acceptance of the commercial purchase agreement after inserting
several additional handwritten conditions constituted a counteroffer and that
there was no contract at that point because there had never been an
unqualified acceptance of an offer without the introduction of additional terms
and conditions.
For cases that hold that attorney approval clauses are conditions
subsequent or create a binding but conditional purchase and sale agreement,
see, e.g., Hubble, 684 N.E.2d at 821 (holding that an attorney approval clause
is a condition subsequent, i.e., only if either attorney disapproved of the
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One has to wonder why some courts have mischaracterized
attorney approval clauses as conditional acceptances and have
construed proposed changes to be counteroffers when the attorney
approval clause was in the contract signed by both parties.
Perhaps it is because the nature of the condition relates to the
terms of the contract rather than something more outside of the
contract, such as obtaining a satisfactory loan commitment or
satisfactory title commitment. Even if this distinction could be
argued so as to turn a conditional contract into a conditional
acceptance, when one contemplates the consequences of this
classification, that there is no obligation to act in good faith and
that a party can now in essence terminate the contract for any
reason, this should cause a court to classify the clause as creating
a conditional contract rather than a conditional acceptance.
Allowing parties to extricate themselves in bad faith from a signed
agreement is not only inconsistent with sound public policy, but is
also inconsistent with the reasonable expectation of parties when
they enter into an agreement that is subject to attorney approval.
It is hoped that the Illinois Supreme Court, if given the
opportunity to address this issue, will adopt the Hubble analysis
on classification of attorney approval clauses, and will reject, to
the extent inconsistent, the Olympic Restaurant, Groshek, and
McKenna cases.
2. Courts Also Encourage Bad Faith DisapprovalsBy Failingto
Adequately Define "Good Faith"AndBy Not RequiringAn Attorney
To Specify The Reasons for Disapproval.
a. The mixed baggage from the Olympic Restaurant'sruling:
Helpful dicta on defining bad faith, but adopting the inimical New
Jersey rule that an attorney does not have to specify the reasons
for disapproval.
88
Olympic Restaurant
is the first reported Illinois decision to

contract within a certain period would the contract become void); Austin v.
Trybus, 524 N.Y.S.2d 895, 896 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (holding that the buyer's
failure to contact an attorney for more than three months after acceptance of
the purchase offer and the attorney's delay in disapproving the contract until
the date of closing were unreasonable as a matter of law and that the
condition of attorney approval ceased to exist because it was not timely
exercised); Frank Realty, Inc. v. Handelsman, 17 Mass. L. Rptr. 433, 2004 WL
808976, *1 (Mass. Super. 2004) (holding that the attorney approval clause and
other conditions in the contract are not conditions precedent to the formation
of the contract); Hein Enterprises, 720 P.2d 975 at 979-80 (holding that where
an attorney approval clause is unambiguous, it must be enforced as written, it
is limited only by the requirement that the attorney act in good faith and that
good faith disapproval by the attorney terminates an already formed contract).
88. Olympic Restaurant,622 N.E.2d 904.
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discuss the requirement of good faith as a possible limitation on
the grounds on which an attorney may disapprove a contract
under an attorney approval clause. On October 30, 1991, the
sellers and the buyer entered into a contract containing an
attorney approval clause that permitted the parties' attorneys to
review it and to propose modifications, other than the stated
purchase price, within ten business days of acceptance of the
contract." Five days later, the sellers entered into a contract with
Olympic Restaurant to sell to Olympic Restaurant the very same
property for $20,000 more."° On November 7, 1991, the sellers'
attorney sent a letter to the buyer and his lawyer stating that he
did not approve the contract and enclosed certain modifications to
it (the attorney could not simply disapprove the contract because
of the wording of the attorney approval clause).91 This letter was
sent within the ten-day review period that expired on November 8,
1991. Later on that same day, the buyer's attorney also sent a
letter requiring that certain changes be made to the contract. The
court concluded that these two letters constituted disapproval of
the proposed modifications by each party, and thus, the contract
became null and void under the attorney review clause.'
The
buyer, however, sued for specific performance of the contract and
argued that the sellers' attorney's exercise of the attorney review
clause was invalid. One of the arguments raised by the buyer was
that the sellers' attorney acted in bad faith, pointing to the other
deal that the sellers signed during the attorney review period.
The court agreed that the sellers' actions in signing a contract
with Olympic Restaurant while their agreement with the buyer
was pending "raised a question of bad faith" on the sellers' part.93
The court also agreed that the other deal may have tainted the
November 7th letter that the sellers' attorney wrote.9 The court
ruled that it did not have to further explore the issue of bad faith
because the trial court ignored the sellers' attorney's letter and
was able to rule that the contract became null and void based upon
the buyer's attorney's letter of November 7th.9' Nonetheless, the
dicta from the Olympic Restaurant case makes clear that if a seller
enters into another contract to sell property they had already
contracted to sell, this raises a question of bad faith and may taint
the sellers' attorney's exercise of the attorney review clause. The
fact that the second contract was financially more lucrative to the
sellers is also relevant to the issue of bad faith and the court notes

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 906.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 908.
Id. at 909.
Id.
Id.
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this aspect when it discusses the possibility that the attorney
review was tainted.9
Although some of the dicta in Olympic Restaurant on the
issue of good faith is helpful in trying to determine what would be
a bad faith exercise of the attorney approval right (i.e. the
relevance of the receipt of a more lucrative deal and execution of
another sales contract), the court made it more difficult to prevent
bad faith terminations when it adopted a rule from a New Jersey
case that an attorney does not have to specify the reason for
disapproval in the notice of disapproval, "because the attorney's97
right to disapprove is a proper exercise of his or her judgment."
Since the court in Olympic Restaurant had already ruled that an
attorney must exercise the right of approval in good faith, how
would requiring the attorney to specify the good faith reason for
the disapproval impede the attorney's exercise of his or her
judgment? Requiring the attorney to state the reason for the
disapproval should not change the standard for review of the
disapproval, which would be one of good faith, unless the contract
clause required more. It is hard to understand why New Jersey
does not require attorneys to state the reason for their disapproval
in the notice of disapproval. Perhaps the reason why New Jersey
provides otherwise is the fact that their attorney approval clauses
are more in the nature of a three-day absolute right of rescission.
The court in the case of Indoe v. Dwyer' (the seminal New Jersey
case on interpreting attorney approvals) noted that, when the
buyer signed the purchase contract, the buyer thought of it as a
mere offer or bid, rather than a document that might become a
binding contract.' After Indoe, a settlement agreement between
brokers and lawyers in New Jersey led to a specifically required
three-day attorney approval clause that is in the nature of a threeday absolute right of rescission. "'
It appears that the Olympic Restaurant court discussed and
adopted the New Jersey rule that an attorney does not have to
specify the reason for disapproval in reaction to the unusual
language in the contract at issue in Olympic Restaurant, which
stated that the attorney may "review and make modifications" to
the contract to clarify that an attorney should be able to
disapprove a contract without doing so based upon the wording of
the contract. The court explained:
[Tihe purpose of such an attorney approval clause is to provide the
purchaser or seller with the opportunity of obtaining legal advice
with respect to the transaction, and its value lies in the fact that the
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Indoe, 424 A.2d 456.
Id. at 457.
See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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contract may be canceled upon receiving such advice. Parties to a
real estate transaction are entitled to the benefit of the judgment of
a trusted counselor, and an approval contingency is designed to
accord this right to those who, for some reason enter into a purchase
and sale agreement before reviewing the matter with their
attorney. ° '
In other words, the Olympic Restaurant court seems to have
adopted the New Jersey rule in order to empower an attorney to
disapprove a contract based upon advice that the attorney
provides to the client relating to the transaction generally rather
than just the words in the contract. As the court explained:
[Tihe only reason to have an attorney review clause is to give the
parties to a contract, who may not be sophisticated in matters
relating to real estate and/or contracts, a chance to have their
attorneys scrutinize the offer before final acceptance. In the present
matter, if there was no way for the parties to get out of the October
25 contract during the review period, the review clause was
meaningless and the attorney review process was a pointless

exercise. 102
In most versions of attorney approval clauses, however, there
is no requirement for the attorney to simply review and make
modifications to the contract; most call for the attorney to be able
to approve or disapprove the contract as well. In the absence of
clear limiting language to the contrary, a court could expansively
interpret an attorney review clause to authorize disapprovals
based on the transaction generally, rather than based only on the
words of the contract. Consequently, the Olympic Restaurant
court should not have adopted the New Jersey rule that an
attorney need not specify the reason for disapproval of a contract
as a means to cure a badly worded contract in the court's
judgment. A better cure for this clause would have been to
interpret it expansively in light of the policy reasons behind the
clause and the reasonable expectations of the parties who rely on
an attorney review of the contract. Instead, the court "fixed" the
potential problem in the case before it by adopting a rule that
increases the likelihood of bad faith terminations.
b. The problematic language of the attorney approval clause also
forced the Groshek court to embrace the Olympic Restaurant's
reasoning
The next reported Illinois decision to discuss the issue of good
faith when exercising an attorney approval clause was Groshek v.
Frainey.01 3 The attorney approval clause in this case required that

101. Olympic Restaurant, 622 N.E.2d at 909(citing Indoe, 424 A. 2d at 460).
102. Id.
103. Groshek, 654 N.E.2d 467.
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the approval not be unreasonably withheld, but it did not
expressly require the attorneys to specify their reasons for
disapproval in the notice of disapproval."' The attorney approval
clause stated that the attorneys may "approve or make
modifications, other than price and dates, mutually acceptable to
the parties."
The buyers' attorney sent a timely notice of
disapproval of the contract without specifying any reasons for the
disapproval and without proposing any changes to the contract.
The sellers argued that, because the clause stated that the
attorney may "approve or make modifications" to the contract, the
buyer's attorney could not simply disapprove the contract but,
instead, must propose modifications to the contract.'
In addition,
the sellers stated that the buyers' attorney had told them that he
was withholding approval of the contract because the buyers had
changed their minds and that any other reasons the attorney gave
were a mere pretext.1 "6 The buyers, however, alleged that the
buyers' attorney had explained to the sellers that he was
withholding his approval for several reasons, including some
concerns over the zoning of an adjacent parcel." 7
In analyzing whether the buyers' attorney's disapproval of the
contract was valid, when the attorney failed to propose
modifications to the contract to explain why he was disapproving
the contract, the court noted,
[The] courts that have interpreted the clause have given the
attorney a much wider scope of authority [than simply negotiating
the inclusion of certain standard clauses or the modification of
already included provisions], permitting disapproval of the contract
for any reason, limited only by an implied covenant of good faith.'O"
The court affirmed the rule in Olympic Restaurant that an
attorney is not required to specify the reason for disapproval."°
The court also stated that, unlike that in Olympic Restaurant, the
contract clause in the case at hand more clearly permitted an
attorney to simply disapprove a contract rather than make
changes to it, and that simply disapproving the contract without
proposing changes to it is not unreasonable. 0 The court briefly
noted the argument that it might be unreasonable to disapprove a
contract and refuse to specify a reason for the disapproval, but
without ruling on this argument, the court stated that this did not
104. Id. at 469.
105. Id. at 469-70.
106. Id. at 469.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 470.
109. Id. at 471.
110. See id. at 471 (stating that although the court in Olympic Restaurant
found some ambiguity in the approval clause at issue, no similar ambiguity
existed in the clause at hand).
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occur in the facts of this case since the buyers' attorney offered to
provide the reasons to the sellers after the sellers argued that the
buyers had improperly exercised the right of attorney approval. 1 '
The Groshek case is quite similar to the Olympic Restaurant
case in that the court appeared to be influenced by the problematic
language in the attorney approval clause (the lack of clear
authority in the clause to simply disapprove the contract as
opposed to being required, if not approving the contract, to make
changes to it) when it ruled that an attorney does not have to
specify a reason for the disapproval. In addition, the court did not
adequately give effect to the contractual language in this case,
which required that any disapproval not be unreasonable, and
instead, only implicitly required that the attorney state the
reasons for disapproval when the other party demands to know the
reasons. The court did not address, in dicta, what reasons may or
may not be "reasonable."
c. While the Hubble court is not required to address the good
faith issue, the difficult facts in the McKenna case lead to a
problematic decision
The third reported decision on attorney approvals in Illinois,
the Hubble case,"' does not shed much light on the issue of good
faith versus bad faith terminations under the attorney approval
clause. In Hubble, the court ruled that the attorney disapproval
right was never timely exercised."' Consequently, the court did
not rule on the issue of whether the buyer's claimed termination
under the attorney approval clause was exercised in good faith.
This would have been an interesting issue because, during
discovery, the buyers admitted that part of their motivation for
trying to terminate the deal was the fact that after signing the
contract, the buyers had a business opportunity to relocate in
Budapest."'
Although the Olympic Restaurantcase indicates that it would
be bad faith for a seller to use the attorney approval clause as a
means to get out of the deal in order to enter into a second deal at
a higher purchase price (when the attorney approval clause
excludes the purchase price as a basis to terminate),"' it appears
111. Id. at 472.
112. Hubble, 684 N.E.2d 816.
113. Id. at 822.
114. Id. at 820.
115. It is interesting to note, however, that when there is no such
qualification in the attorney approval clause, some courts have permitted
attorney disapproval based upon the purchase price. See Ulrich v. Daly, 650
N.Y.S.2d 496, 497 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (holding that an attorney may
disapprove a contract on the basis of the price and a better offer since the
attorney approval clause did not expressly exclude such disapproval). But see
infra notes 147-148 and accompanying text (discussing how there is a split
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that the seller in the McKenna case"' did precisely this, and yet,
the court ruled that the attorney disapproval was in good faith. In
McKenna, the seller, an unsophisticated homeowner, was
pressured by a real estate developer to sign a purchase and sale
agreement for the sale of her home. After a few hours of
negotiating, the developer ultimately offered to buy the home at
$9,000 less than the list price, but forced the seller to "take it or
leave it" with only about two hours to decide." 7 The seller went
ahead and signed the contract, even though she wanted to consult
her attorney first, because there was an attorney approval clause
in the contract and her attorney's secretary told the seller that she
would be protected with the clause in place."'
Similar to the seller in Olympic Restaurant, the seller in
McKenna received a higher offer for the property during the
attorney approval period (an offer of $480,000 compared with the
developer's offer of $450,000).
The seller's attorney sent a
disapproval letter to the developer's attorney one day after the
higher offer came in, but within the time frame required in the
contract. About one week later, the seller accepted the second
buyer's higher offer. The developer argued that the disapproval
was invalid since it was based upon the purchase price, rather
than the form of the contract, as required by the language of the
attorney approval clause. The seller's attorney stated that the
other offer was not relevant to the attorney's rejection of the first
contract and that the reason for the disapproval was the attorney's
objection to one of the paragraphs in the contract, which only gave
the seller a maximum of three hours to accept the contract. 19 The
trial court accepted and believed the seller's attorney's testimony
and the appellate court upheld the directed verdict that there was
no bad faith termination.1°
The McKenna ruling that the attorney approval clause was
exercised in good faith is troublesome because it is difficult to
understand how the three-hour period, by itself, is objectionable if
the contract contained a satisfactory attorney approval clause that
would allow the attorney to approve or disapprove the contract in
a broad, good faith fashion. But during discovery, the seller's
attorney apparently failed to identify any problems with the
attorney approval clause, with any other terms in the contract, or
with the deal generally. How was the client harmed by the threehour period for response (the typical period is usually as little as
between courts when the approval clause does not contain a limitation on price
considerations when seeking to disapprove the contract).
116. McKenna, 704 N.E. 2d at 829.
117. Id. at 828.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 829.
120. Id. at 829-30.
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one day to as many as several days)? Without a more plausible
explanation for the disapproval, the most obvious reason was that
the seller had received a better offer during the attorney approval
period. One must ask, if that offer had not come in, or if the
developer had offered $480,000 for the property, would the seller's
attorney have objected to the three-hour period? Implicit in the
case, though, is the understanding that it would be considered bad
faith if the attorney disapproved based on the other deal or the
purchase price in the contract.12' The court simply chose to believe
the testimony of the attorney that the real reason for the rejection
was the timing provision in the contract rather than the second,
higher offer.'
It appears that the McKenna court relied so heavily upon the
seller's attorney's testimony (although in Olympic Restaurantthe
court stated in dicta that in similar circumstances the exercise of
the attorney approval could be considered tainted with bad faith)
because of the heavy-handed way in which the sophisticated buyer
pressured the seller to sign the contract."' Indeed, when the
seller's attorney failed to send the attorney disapproval notice to
the buyer and its attorney as required by the contract (the seller's
attorney sent the notice to the buyer's broker instead), the court
ruled that this still complied with the requirements of the contract
because the buyer clearly received notice from the broker since the
buyer thereafter recorded a memorandum of the contract to cloud
the title to the property."' The McKenna case may well represent
one of those situations where hard facts make bad law.
d. Courts in New Jersey and New York have faced dilemmas
similar to those faced by Illinois courts
Due to the paucity of Illinois case law to define the scope of
good faith in the context of an attorney approval clause, it is useful
to look at how courts in other jurisdictions have defined and
applied the concept in the context of an attorney approval clause.

121. This may be true even though the contract clause does not specifically
prohibit disapproval based on the purchase price. The clause simply states
that the contract is contingent on approval hereof as to "form." The seller's
attorney could have argued that a second reason for the disapproval was the
purchase price, which is a term in the form just as the three hour period is a
term in the form. Perhaps the seller's attorney did not raise this argument for
fear that the court would rule that the purchase price is not a matter that an
attorney can raise in good faith.
122. Another possibility would be that the attorney may not think it wise for
the client to deal with a buyer who would put so much pressure on the seller.
The attorney may be concerned that the buyer will be unreasonable
throughout the transaction, but this possibility was not raised in the case as a
point that the attorney made.
123. McKenna, 704 N.E.2d at 829-30.
124. Id. at 830.
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We have already mentioned the broad discretion that courts in
New Jersey afford attorneys under an attorney approval clause.
The court in Indoe v. Dwyer.2 (a case that pre-dated the settlement
agreement between brokers and attorneys) interpreted an
attorney approval clause stating in part, "[T]his contract, except as
to price and financing terms (if any), is contingent upon approval
by the respective attorneys for purchasers and sellers within three
(3) business days of the date hereof."" 6 The buyer's attorney in
that case stated during pre-trial discovery that the reasons why he
disapproved the contract were: carpeting was not included in the
sale as the buyer had expected, there was no specification as to
what personal property was included, the close proximity of the
swimming pool to the kitchen doors, the lack of potability and
septic system tests, the shortness of the time period for
satisfaction of the mortgage contingency, the fact that the buyer's
husband had not signed the contract [the wife had thought that
the contract she signed was merely a bid and that a contract would
be prepared with the assistance of her attorney with terms
acceptable to her attorney and her husband], and "other intangible
considerations.". 7 At the time of the exercise of the disapproval,
however, the buyer's attorney had merely stated that the
disapproval was for reasons other than purchase price and
financing terms."'
The Indoe court ruled that the scope of the attorney approval
is not limited to legal deficiencies with the contract, as the plaintiff
in the case argued, but can include disapproval based upon the
"practicability or desirability of undertaking the sale or
purchase... to avoid precipitous actions which may prove to be
legally, financially, or socially disadvantageous."" 9 The court also
ruled that, because the purpose of the clause is to permit parties to
a real estate transaction the benefit of a trusted counselor when
they have entered into a contract before reviewing the matter with
their attorney, this right should not be "diluted or denied by
requiring that the attorney's judgment be measured by some
standard, other than good faith, or another's opinion."2 ° If the
parties wanted the attorney approval power to be limited to
disapproving only on objectively reasonable grounds, the contract
should have so stated.1 1 The court held that the disapproval at
issue was valid because the disapproval voiced by the buyers'

125. Indoe, 424 A.2d 456.
126. Id. at 458.
127. Id. at 457.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 460.
130. Id.
131. See id. (stating that buyers were entitled to the benefit of their
bargain).
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attorney was an exercise of his judgment "and his reasons
therefore were not subject to review or contradiction," and because
there was "no basis for a claim of bad faith or capriciousness on
the part of the defendants [the buyers], or their attorney, in the
use of this contingency provision, which would render the notice of
disapproval ineffective. 32
The Indoe court granted a broad scope for the attorney's
review consistent with the underlying purpose of the attorney
approval clause: to allow the parties to have the benefit of advice
from a competent attorney relating to potential problems with the
deal. The court concluded that, to maintain that purpose, a good
faith standard should be applied to scrutinizing the validity of the
disapproval rather than requiring that the attorney's reasons be
"reasonable" according to an "objective" standard. It makes sense
to not require an attorney to satisfy some objective standard of
what is reasonable and to allow the attorney wide discretion in
advising her client on the prudence of the deal, especially since
many attorneys who are not adequately trained in transactional
skills fail to note and address various risks and this should not be
used against a well-trained attorney who does raise these points
with the client. Yet, the Indoe court could and should have
required the attorney to state the reasons for disapproval at the
time of the exercise of attorney approval to ensure that the
disapproval is in good faith and not a mere pretext.
New York courts have also broadly interpreted an attorney's
right to disapprove a contract under an attorney approval clause.
In Ulrich v. Daly,33 the attorney approval clause stated, "[Tihis
agreement is contingent upon Purchaser and Seller obtaining
approval of this Agreement by their attorney as to all matters
contained therein."'34
The seller's attorney disapproved the
agreement because the seller received a second offer for a higher
purchase price, with no mortgage contingency clause and an
earlier closing date. The court ruled that it was not bad faith for
the attorney to consider other offers, as this provided extrinsic
evidence relating to the terms of the contract.'35 For example, the
court reasoned, a seller's attorney should be able to disapprove a
contract if the interest rate on the financing contingency is below
market rates and the attorney should be able to consider the
extrinsic fact of market rates in approving the matters contained
in the contract, unless the contract specifies to the contrary.'3 6 The
court also ruled that there was no evidence of bad faith by the

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Ulrich, 650 N.Y.S. 2d 496.
Id. at 497.
Id.
Id. at 497-98.
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sellers because "there [was] no evidence that defendants interfered
and prevented their attorney from considering the contract."137
The Ulrich's result and dicta are sound. The attorney
approval clause stated that it related to "all matters" in the
contract and did not exclude the purchase price, financing clause,
or closing date. One could argue that, notwithstanding this
language, it is rare for an attorney to provide advice on the
purchase price, and so it was not in the reasonable contemplation
of the parties that this term would also be included. Yet, at the
same time, the language is quite clear when it says "all" terms. In
addition, allowing an attorney to consider extrinsic factors, such as
market level interest rates for a prime loan, when the contract
allowed disapproval on the basis of any of the terms in the
contract, including the financing terms, is consistent with the
underlying purpose of the attorney approval clause. 138 Finally, the
ruling that there was no evidence of bad faith, because there was
no evidence that the sellers had interfered with or prevented their
attorney from considering the contract, provides a very helpful test
on the issue of what constitutes a bad faith disapproval.
The court in McKenna v. Case'39 ruled that an attorney
disapproval of a contract will be considered in bad faith and
invalid if it is based upon instructions from the client to
disapprove, rather than based upon the attorney's review of the
contract with the client. 40 The court in Tavarozzi v. Emmanuel'
The sellers in Tavarozzi argued that the
applied this rule.
attorney approval clause could be used to void the contract for any
The attorney approval clause had been
reason whatsoever.
added to the contract by the seller's broker and it stated that the
contract was contingent upon the sellers' attorney's review and
approval of the contract within fourteen days of acceptance - with
a separate, similar provision for the buyer's attorney's review and
approval of the contract. The buyer argued that the reason for
disapproval under this clause must relate to the attorney's actual
The court agreed with the buyer and
review of the contract."
ruled that under the implied covenant of good faith, an attorney
cannot disapprove a contract in order for the seller to void the deal
to pursue a deal with someone else. Thus, the sellers' attorney's
disapproval of the contract in the case violated the covenant of
137. Id. at 498.
138. The underlying purpose of the attorney approval clause is to receive all
of the advice that a competent attorney would provide to her client, such as
disapproving the contract if it would require the buyer to obtain an overpriced
or unaffordable loan. See generally supra, note 20 and accompanying text.
139. McKenna v. Case, 507 N.Y.S.2d 777, 777 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
140. Id.
141. Tavarozzi, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 402.
142. Id. at *5.
143. Id.
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good faith implied in all contracts and rendered the disapproval
invalid.'"
e.

Lessons to be drawn from these cases.

The key guidepost that attorneys can turn to from these cases
on what constitutes good faith in the context of an attorney
disapproval clause is that the disapproval cannot be based upon a
direction from the client to disapprove, but must be based upon
the attorney's actual review of the contract. If the client is not
asking the attorney to review the contract and to provide counsel
to the client on the contract and the deal, but is instead directing
the attorney to disapprove the contract unrelated to any advice
from the attorney on the deal, then it is not a proper exercise of
the attorney approval right.
The cases also underscore how the wording of the attorney
approval clause greatly impacts what will be considered a proper
basis for its exercise. Courts have enforced approval clauses that
clearly state that disapproval cannot be based upon the purchase
price."' When the approval clause does not contain this limitation,
there is a split on what occurs. Some courts still would impose
this limitation since it is presumed that is what the parties
intended. 46
Yet, some courts allow an attorney in this
circumstance to disapprove on the basis of the price and a better
offer since the clause did not expressly exclude this (indeed, the
clause spoke of approval as to all matters in the contract) and an
attorney may advise the client on the prudence of the deal

144. Id. at *15. The court also ruled that to read the attorney approval
clause in the broad fashion that the seller proposed would be inconsistent with

some of the other provisions in the contract where certain other conditions to
closing were established during the same fourteen day period (such as the

right of the buyer to review the Declaration and other restrictions on use as a
condition to closing). Id. at *11-12.

The court argued that if the buyer or

seller could terminate the contract for any reason for a fourteen day period
under the attorney review clause, then there would be no reason to require all
these other conditions to closing during the same period. Id. at *12.
Consequently, the attorney review clause was not intended to permit

termination for any reason whatsoever.
145. See Indoe, 424 A.2d at 460 (holding that an attorney approval clause
that prohibits modifications or disapprovals as to price or financing terms will
be enforceable as to those terms and the requirement of good faith).
146. See Olympic Restaurant, 622 N.E.2d at 908 (hinting that when a seller's
disapproval is motivated by higher prices, a court could rule that such actions
diverge from good faith obligations imposed by the contract); Groshek, 654
N.E. 2d at 471 (discussing Olympic Restaurant and finding no ambiguity in
the attorney approval clause). Yet, both Olympic Restaurant and Groshek

failed to reach the merits of such issue, because these courts held that the
attorney disapproval served as a counteroffer that terminated the original

contract.
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generally, not just on purely legal issues.147 Thus, if an attorney
approval clause is as broadly worded as in the Ulrich case
(allowing approval or disapproval as to all matters contained in
the contract), then the attorney might even be able to disapprove
based on the purchase price in the contract in light of another offer
on the table. However, if a court rules that the clause is
ambiguous and then admits extrinsic evidence regarding the
reasonable expectations of the parties (based upon the
surrounding circumstances and any conversations the parties and
the broker may have had regarding the clause), it is possible that
the court would find disapproval on this basis to be invalid. "
147. Ulrich, 650 N.Y.S. 2d 497; Stevens, 714 N.E.2d 956, 962-63; Trenta, 468
A.2d at 739-40.
148. In determining whether a written contract is ambiguous, the traditional
and mechanical approach has been to ascertain whether the contract is
'complete-on-its-face," also known as the "four corners rule." Yet, some courts
have tended to move away from that approach and have accepted evidence of
the parties' negotiations and of other relevant and external circumstances in
order to ascertain whether a written contract is ambiguous. Ferdinand S.
Tinio, Annotation, The Parol Evidence Rule And Admissibility Of Extrinsic
Evidence To EstablishAnd Clarify Ambiguity In Written Contract,40 A.L.R.3d
1384 at *4 (1971). One case from New Jersey has often been cited as a pioneer
in this approach. See Garden State Plaza Corp. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 189 A.2d
448, 454 (N.J. Super. 1963). The court stated:
[I]n the process of interpretation and construction of the integrated
agreement all relevant evidence pointing to meaning is admissible
because experience teaches that language is so poor an instrument for
communication or expression of intent that ordinarily all surrounding
circumstances and conditions must be examined before there is any
trustworthy assurance of derivation of contractual intent, even by
reasonable judges of ordinary intelligence, from any given set of words
which the parties have committed to paper as their contract.
Construing a contract of debatable meaning by resort to surrounding
and antecedent circumstances and negotiations for light as to the
meaning of the words used is never a violation of the parol evidence rule.
Id. (emphasis added).
Illinois has not been as forward as New Jersey, but there are several cases
stating that relevant parol evidence is always admissible to assist in the
determination of what the words used in an integrated writing mean. See,
e.g., Sunstream Jet Express v. Int'l Air Serv. Co., 734 F.2d 1258, 1266 (7th Cir.
1984) (applying Illinois law). "Admitting evidence of prior negotiations and
agreements for the purpose of discovering the meaning of the terms used in
the integration does not violate the parol evidence rule." Id. (quoting Ortman
v. Stanray Corp., 437 F.2d 231, 235 (7th Cir. 1971)). See also, Brooklyn Bagel
Boys, Inc. v. Earthgrains Refrigerated Dough Prods. Inc., 212 F.3d 373, 380
(7th Cir. 2000) (holding that "notwithstanding the parol evidence rule,
extrinsic evidence can be admitted to discover the parties' genuine intent
when a contract is ambiguous, but 'there must be either contractual language
on which to hang the label of ambiguous or some yawning void.., that cries
out for an implied term.'")(quoting Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d
603, 608 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc)(plurality opinion)).
In addition, that the contract may appear integrated and that one party
may have fulfilled its obligations under the contract will not excuse that party
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3. Analysis of Whether Attorney DisapprovalIn Various Scenarios
Would Be Deemed To Be In Good Faith
Attorneys have encountered difficult scenarios when
operating under an attorney approval clause navigating the
territory between the duty to zealously represent their client and
the duty to exercise the attorney approval clause in good faith.
The following are scenarios that attorneys have faced, or may face
in the future, and an analysis based on current case law on
whether the attorney could in good faith disapprove the contract in
each circumstance.
a. The buyer finds out during the attorney approvalperiod that
she needs to relocate to anothercity. For this reason, she directs
her attorney to disapprove the contract.
This would be a clear case of a bad faith termination even
though the buyer is not terminating to pursue a better deal. There
is case law that makes it clear that an attorney cannot disapprove
a contract based solely on the client's direction to do so. If the
client instructs the attorney to review the contract and find a
reason to disapprove, the same result should apply. A false review
of the contract should be construed as the charade that it is. If the
client tells the attorney of her situation and asks what can be done
under the attorney approval clause, the attorney should be able to
review the contract to raise any points they would ordinarily raise,
looking at such issues as the right to assign contract rights and
remedies for default in light of the client's special needs and
proposing changes to the contract to permit assignment (if not
permitted) or to limit the remedies if the default occurs soon after
the contract is entered into (within the first week or so, since
reliance is not as great if the termination occurs soon after the
contract is signed).
b. The attorney has reviewed the contract and raised various
issues with the seller. After consultation the seller directs the
attorney to disapprove the contract, but the attorney knows that
part of the reason for the disapproval is the fact that the seller has
received during the attorney approvalperiod a higher priced offer.
This scenario assumes that the form contract prohibits an
attorney from disapproving based on the purchase price. 49 Some
from liability for breach of the implied covenant of good faith. See e.g., Zenith
Insurance Co. v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 141 F.3d 300, 308 (7th Cir.
1998) (holding that "a party may be liable for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith even though all the terms of the written agreement may have been

fulfilled"). "A party seeking to recover under this theory must show something
that can support a conclusion that the party accused of bad faith has actually
denied the benefit of the bargain originally intended by the parties." Id.
149. If the contract permitted disapproval based on any term in the contract,
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form contracts actually address this issue. For example, the
Illinois multi-board and bar association form purchase and sale
agreement provides that an attorney can disapprove when part of
the reason for the disapproval is the purchase price. However, if
the buyer can show that "but for" the second, higher offer, the
attorney would not have disapproved the deal (i.e. the real motive
for the disapproval was the other deal), then a court might rule
that the disapproval was not in good faith. For example, if the
attorney in the McKenna case from Illinois had disapproved the
contract due to the three hour time limit for the seller to accept
the buyer's offer, even if the seller had not received a higher
purchase offer during the attorney approval period, then this
would have been a good faith disapproval, even though the other
deal was a factor as well. But if the seller's attorney would not
have disapproved the contract "but for" the other offer, then one
could argue that the disapproval was in bad faith.
c. The seller asks her attorney to review the contract under the
attorney approval clause and the attorney advises her, after asking
her when she purchasedthe home, that the seller will suffer adverse
tax consequences from the sale because she will be selling it in less
than two years from buying it. Seller's attorney disapproves the
contract on this basis.
Assuming that the attorney approval clause is broadly worded
(as opposed to requiring the attorney to solely "review and modify"
the contract), this should not be deemed an improper exercise of
the attorney approval. It is clearly not being exercised in bad faith
and it relates to the type of counseling that a well trained attorney
would provide for her client. If the attorney approval clause
requires the attorney to review and modify (rather than only
disapprove) the terms of the contract, one way to address the
client's problem within the parameters of the contract is to require
that the closing date be changed to occur on the date that coincides
with the second anniversary of the seller's purchase of the home
(assuming that the closing date is not explicitly excluded as a term
of the contract that can be proposed to be revised under the
attorney approval clause).

including the purchase price, then there is little issue of good faith since the
other offer is extrinsic evidence of the reasonableness of the price, a term of
the contract that the attorney is allowed to review based on the express
language of the contract.
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d. The buyer asks her attorney to review the contract under an
attorney approval clause. The buyer's attorney notices that the
interest rate in the financing contingency looks high compared with
market rates for a prime loan. The attorney asks her client about
the loan that she has sought and learns that the buyer has good
credit but that she is making a small down payment and, if she
closes on this deal, about 50% of her monthly income will go
towards paying the monthly principal and interest on the loan and
the estimated monthly real estate taxes and insurance. After
reviewing these numbers with her attorney and learningthat this is
a very imprudent deal, the buyer and the attorney decide that the
attorney should disapprove the contract.
Although, in the past, it was not customary for an attorney
representing a buyer to provide the buyer with extensive advice on
the financial terms of the loan that she planned to enter into,
today, this should no longer be the case and disapproval (or
requiring changes) based on the loan described in the contract
being overpriced or unaffordable should not be deemed to be in bad
faith. Due to the increased complexity and myriad of choices
among loan products".. and the prevalence of predatory lending,'
it is sometimes imperative and almost always highly advisable
that an attorney explain to the home buyer the basic terms of the
loan she has entered into,"2 and to provide advice to the client on
whether the loan sought is one the client can afford to pay... and
not overpriced in light of the buyer's credit score."' Because a well
150. See Debra Pogrund Stark, Unmasking the Predatory Loan in Sheep's
Clothing:A Legislative Proposal,21 HARv. BLAcKLErIER J. 129, 131-34 (2005)
(describing the evolution of the mortgage industry in the latter half of the 20th
century in the United States., the development of predatory lending, and the
difficulties with trying to prevent it).
151. Id.
152. For example, a buyer may be told that the interest rate is at 6% and the
monthly payments are $1,500 per month, but the loan might be one where it
starts off as interest only and at a fixed rate and then three years later
converts to interest and principal and at a floating rate. This could lead to the
buyer later not being able to make payments on the loan.
153. See id. at 138-39 (suggesting that counselors, working together with the
borrower, review the borrower's financial situation and income to debt ratio
under the proposed loan, and "advise the borrower that he is in grave danger
of defaulting on the loan if the monthly payments on this and any other
mortgages on his home (plus taxes, insurance, and any condominium
assessments, if applicable) are greater than 50% of the borrower's monthly
gross income," that a conservative debt service ratio is 25%, and that anything
over that amount is imprudent).
154. See id. at 137 (suggesting how a mortgage counselor could easily and
cheaply determine online the borrower's credit score and the borrower's
market APR figure in light of this score).
The counselor can then compare what the lender is offering with the
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trained and competent attorney should, in today's real estate
finance market, provide advice on these issues," 5 the attorney
should also be able to disapprove a contract when the buyer must
enter into an unaffordable loan to close the deal. As for an
overpriced loan, if the contract states that the buyer must accept a
loan that the attorney determines is overpriced, rather than
disapprove the contract, the attorney could instead require
revisions of the loan terms specified in the contract to reflect a
properly priced loan in terms of interest rate and points.
However, if the attorney approval clause is worded narrowly,
such as limiting the review to the terms of the contract (excluding
the purchase price) and requiring the attorney to make changes to
the terms rather than simply disapprove, then it would be beyond
the scope of the attorney review clause to disapprove the contract
because the deal would cause the buyer to enter into an imprudent
or unaffordable loan. If the attorney approval clause allows
disapproval (as opposed to requiring proposed changes) based on
the terms of the contract, one could argue that the term of the
contract that is being disapproved is the financing term (i.e. it
states a loan amount that the buyer cannot prudently afford to pay
each month), and disapproval would therefore be in good faith and
within the mandate of the attorney approval clause. Even though
the loan amount is based in large part on the purchase price
(which some attorney approval clauses expressly state cannot be
renegotiated), it is also based upon the buyer's anticipated equity
in the purchase and so, this should not be construed as a means to
revise the purchase price.
e.
The attorney approval clause states that the attorney has five
days to approve or disapprove the contract,excluding disapproving
based on any "business"terms of the contract (includingwithout
limitation, the price and dates in the contract). The seller's
attorney wishes to disapprove the contract because the financing
contingency in the contract is too long (90 days) causing the seller
to hold the property off the market for too long in case the condition
is not satisfied. The seller's attorney decides to disapprove based
upon the narrow wording of the attorney approval clause.
market APR figure... The mortgage counselor should be knowledgeable
of the typical closing cost items and what the customary charges are for
these items. The counselor can then let the borrower know if the good
faith estimate reflects market or above market figures.

Id.
155. Prior to the advent of the widespread development of predatory lending
beginning in the 1990's, it was not typical for an attorney to review in detail
the economics of a home buyer's mortgage loan. Today, however, an attorney
should at the very least address with her client this topic generally (especially
if a non-sophisticated client) and ask the client if the client would like advice
on the loan terms.
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Once again, the analysis of the validity of this disapproval is
based upon satisfaction of two criteria: good faith and compliance
with the wording (and therefore the scope) of the attorney
approval clause at issue. As for good faith, a potential problem
exists here. Mitigating against a finding of bad faith is the fact
that the disapproval is not based on a desire to get out of the deal
for matters unrelated to what an attorney would normally counsel
(such as the occurrence of a subsequent better offer). However, the
attorney's real reason for disapproval in this scenario is a matter
specifically excluded from consideration under the express
language of the attorney approval clause. Yet, if the attorney
approval clause were worded differently, the attorney would be
able to disapprove in good faith if the other party would not agree
to modify the contract to contain a shorter, more customary,
period.
Disapproving based on the wording of the attorney
approval clause is not a disapproval based on a business point and
so, it is arguably proper under the terms of the clause itself.
But where does one draw the line? For example, what if the
attorney felt that the broker pressured the buyer to enter into a
deal where the purchase price was way too low and disapproved
based on the wording of the approval clause in the contract that
excluded purchase price from the terms the attorney can review?
One way to address this scenario is to allow attorney disapproval
of the wording of the attorney approval clause when the wording is
different from what is customary, because this would hinder an
attorney from representing their client in a competent fashion, or
would permit an attorney to go beyond what a competent attorney
would normally be doing when reviewing the contract.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COURTS AND TO
REAL ESTATE PROFESSIONALS

A. Recommendations to the Courts on the Proper
Interpretationof Attorney Approval Clauses
In light of the prior analysis of case law and summary of the
steps taken by a properly trained attorney competently
representing a home buyer or home seller, the author offers five
recommendations to courts interpreting an attorney approval
clause in the context of a residential real estate deal. Also, due to
the division of opinions within the Illinois courts, this issue is ripe
for review by the Illinois Supreme Court and it is hoped that the
Illinois Supreme Court will create a better judicial "North Star" for
attorneys to follow based upon the recommendations in this
article.
First, when the attorney approval clause is contained in the
purchase and sale contract that both parties have signed, the court
should correctly interpret the clause as creating a conditional
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contract (hence, requiring "good faith" in its exercise) rather than
as a conditional acceptance (a characterization that produces the
undesirable effect that "good faith" is not required in the exercise
of the clause, since no contract has been created in the first place).
This interpretation will not only prevent many bad faith
terminations of the purchase and sale contract on an incorrect
technicality, it will also remove the straight-jacket in which
attorneys currently operate when, normally, they would desire to
propose certain changes to a contract without potentially killing a
deal.
If the law becomes clear that these clauses create
conditional contracts, then a mere suggestion for a change before
the attorney approval period is over will not allow the other party
to claim that this is a counteroffer and that there is no binding
deal due to the suggested change.
Second, the court should require that if an attorney elects to
disapprove the contract, the attorney must specify the reasons for
the disapproval at the time of the disapproval (when a contract is
silent on this point) to discourage attempted bad faith
terminations under the attorney approval clause. The test for
good faith would be based upon whether the attorney had in fact
reviewed the contract and the deal with the client in the manner
that a competent, well trained attorney would, and whether the
reason for the disapproval is based upon this review (which would
then be a good faith termination) as opposed to a disapproval
based on a collateral matter not within that review, or based upon
a direction from the client independent of that review (which
would then constitute a bad faith termination). It is recommended
that the party who exercises the disapproval right bear the burden
of proving good faith if the issue is litigated,'56 but it would not be

156. Supra note 46, discusses the issue of whether a party's attorney

disapproved the contract in good faith and whether the non-disapproving
party can force that attorney to disclose confidential information to support (or
reveal lack of) good faith, are closely intertwined. Further, the reported

decisions from Illinois and elsewhere have not discussed the issue of who
should bear the burden of proving that the contract disapproval pursuant to
an attorney approval clause was made in good faith. Other areas of law have
adopted, statutorily or through common law, various standards regarding

which party should bear the burden of proving good faith in contract disputes.
There is a line of cases which have held that the party seeking to recover
under the theory of breach of the implied covenant of good faith has the
burden of proving that the other party had acted in bad faith. See, e.g., Zenith,
141 F.3d at 308 (holding that a party may be liable for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith even though all the terms of the written agreement may
have been fulfilled, and that the party seeking to recover under this theory has
the burden of proving that the party accused of bad faith has actually denied
the benefit of the bargain originally intended by the parties). See also St.
Louis Smelting & Refining Co. v. Nix, 224 P. 982, 984 (Okla. 1924) (stating
that where the buyer sought to rescind a contract of sale of certain mining
leases because the titles thereto were disapproved by his attorney, the seller
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desirable to apply a reasonableness test to the attorney
disapproval, as some attorneys are better trained than others and
may raise points that a typical attorney may not have considered.
Another reason against adopting a reasonableness test is the
different levels of risk that each client can tolerate, where some
clients will accept risk that others would not in light of the
potential problem raised by the attorney.
To illustrate this point, assume that the home the buyer
wants to purchase encroaches onto a neighbor's property. The
contract may call for the buyer to accept title subject to this risk so
long as the risk is insured over by a title company.
Some
purchasers, after being counseled by their attorney on the
ramifications of this situation, would decide to go ahead on this
basis, but others might in good faith decide not to.
If a
"reasonableness" standard is employed, a party who in good faith
does not want to take on certain risks might be forced to do so.
This is inconsistent with the reason for the attorney approval
clause, namely, to put the parties in the position they would have
been in if a competent, well-trained attorney had been
representing them at the time the contract was formed.
Third, if the reason specified for the disapproval is one that
could have been addressed through a modification of the contract,
and the non-disapproving party proposes such rider to the contract
in response to the disapproving party's disapproval, then the
disapproving attorney should change her disapproval into an
approval based upon this change to the contract. That is, unless
the disapproving attorney can show that the revision would not
adequately address the reason for the disapproval. The test for
whether the change adequately addresses the client's concerns,
needs, or goals would be based on good faith rather than
reasonableness because different clients have different risk
tolerance levels or value certain attributes of the property they are
purchasing at different levels.
Fourth, when confronted by a situation involving mixed
motives (i.e., when the disapproving party is doing so in part for
legitimate reasons and in part for reasons that would be
considered in bad faith because the reason goes beyond the scope
who pleaded bad faith upon the part of such buyer and his attorney in
disapproving such titles had the burden of establishing such bad faith).
However, there are other areas of the law where the burden of proving that a
discretionary right was exercised in good faith rests upon the party that
claims to have exercised the right in good faith. See e.g., Ollice v. Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co., 659 P.2d 1182, 1187 (Alaska. 1983) (discussing how in

action for wrongful interference with employment contract in which third
party conceded that it instructed employer to fire employee from security
guard position on basis that she consumed alcohol on company premises, the

third party had burden of proving that it acted in good faith, and that its
justification was not mere pretext, shielding improper ulterior motive).
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of the wording of the attorney approval clause), the court should
apply a "but for" test to determine if the exercise is valid. Under
the "but for" test, the court would ask and answer this question:
"But for the bad faith reason, would the attorney still have
disapproved the contract?"
Finally, the court should analyze the validity of any
disapproval, based not only on the wording of the clause, but also
on the policy reasons for having the attorney approval clauses.
The purpose behind the attorney approval clause is to enable the
parties to the contract to be placed in the position that they would
have enjoyed had an attorney been providing them with the kind
of advice that a competent, well-trained attorney would have
provided to her client at the time that the contract to purchase and
sell was formed.
B. Recommendations To Attorneys On How To Both Zealously
Represent Their Clients and Exercise The Attorney Approval Right
In Good Faith
This Article also offers some recommendations
to
practitioners on how to both zealously represent their clients and
exercise the attorney approval right in good faith in light of
current case law.
First, attorneys should alert their clients that, under current
case law, there exists the possibility that if the attorney suggests
any changes to the contract, the other party could terminate the
contract in bad faith."' Consequently, it is important for the
attorney and the client to decide up front whether the changes
desired are worth potentially terminating the deal.
Second, if the client informs the attorney that she does not
want to terminate the deal, but would like to have the benefit of
certain changes to the contract, the attorney should consider
telephoning the other attorney to see if she desires any changes to
the contract and if the other side would be receptive to changing
the terms of the contract. It is hoped that such telephone calls will
not be considered a counteroffer, but it is still possible that they
will be construed as such.
When sending any written
communication asking for these changes, one could view this is as
a mere request that does not constitute a counteroffer, but if a
court incorrectly construes contract law by applying the mirror
image rule to an already signed contract that contained the
attorney approval clause, then this language is unlikely to work.

157. See supra Part III.B.1. (discussing how the current state of law in
Illinois considers attorney approval clauses as creating conditional
acceptances of the contract, and how such incorrect characterization can lead
to bad faith terminations of contracts).
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Third, if a client directs an attorney to disapprove a contract
before the attorney has had a chance to review the contract and
counsel the client, the attorney should either cease representing
this client, or explain to the client that this is improper and then
propose and follow a proper course of action.
Finally, if an attorney believes that a client's real reason for
directing the attorney to disapprove after consultation with the
attorney is improper, the attorney should cease representing the
client or explain that this action is impermissible and propose and
follow a proper course of action. Although current case law does
1
not require an attorney to specify the reasons for disapproval, 8
when the issue of good faith has been litigated, the disapproving
attorneys have been deposed and forced to testify at trial as to the
real motivations for the disapproval.' 9 If the client's motives are
based partially on legitimate matters (based upon the advice that
the attorney gave to the client in light of the attorney's review of
the contract and the deal) and partially on illegitimate matters
(such as receipt of a better deal during the attorney approval
period when the attorney approval clause prohibits disapproval
based on purchase price), the attorney should apply the "but for"
test outlined above in Part IV.A. to determine if disapproval would
be in good faith (i.e., would the client have directed the attorney to
disapprove the contract but for the impermissible reason).
C. Recommendations To BrokerageAssociations And Bar
Associations On The Wording Of The Attorney Approval Clause
Part III of this Article already contains a detailed evaluation
of the effectiveness of the wording of the attorney approval clauses
in several reported decisions in Illinois. Each attorney approval
clause was found to be lacking to varying degrees in terms of the
goal of enabling an attorney to perform the type of review of the
contract and the deal that a competent, well-trained attorney
would perform, while at the same time preventing bad faith
terminations.

158. McKenna, 704 N.E. 2d at 829, (citing Olympic Restaurants, 622 N.E. 2d
at 909 (stating that "[wihile the review clause must be invoked in good faith, it
is not necessary for a party to state a reason when rejecting a contract
pursuant to a review clause because the attorney's right to disapprove is a
proper exercise of his or her judgment")).
159. See e.g, McKenna, 704 N.E. 2d at 829 (providing parts of the deposition
and testimony of the buyer's attorney regarding the transaction at issue);
Whitlock, 1974 Ohio App. LEXIS at *6 (holding that the seller had waived the
attorney-client privilege when the seller called the counsel that disapproved
the contract pursuant to the attorney approval clause to the stand, and posed
questions concerning the exercise of good faith in the giving of advice to the
seller, and that the buyer had the right to cross-examine the seller's counsel
concerning the exercise of good faith).
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The attorney approval clause that best serves this dual goal
and is most frequently utilized by parties is the attorney review
clause contained in the Multi-Board Residential Real Estate
Contract 3.0 (the "Multi-Board Clause").16 ° As previously noted,
the Multi-Board Clause clearly allows an attorney to make
modifications to the contract, rather than only allowing approval
or disapproval of the contract in its entirety. It also provides for
an additional five business days after a modification is proposed
for the parties to try to reach agreement on the proposed
modification(s). The Multi-Board Clause also clarifies that the
modification16' cannot be based solely upon the stated purchase
price, a limitation that is probably consistent with what most
buyers and sellers would expect, and does not contain any other
limitation on the attorney's scope of review of the contract.
The Multi-Board Clause, however, should be revised to
require that the attorney specify the reason for the disapproval at
the time she gives notice of the disapproval to prevent bad faith
terminations.
It should also be revised to permit the other
attorney to propose modifications to the contract that would
address the disapproving party's attorney's reason(s) for the
disapproval, requiring the disapproving party and her attorney to
consider in good faith the proposed modification(s) as an
alternative to disapproval. The clause should provide for an
additional five-business-day period for the disapproving attorney
to reconsider, and a requirement to notify the other party of
whether they still disapprove or accept the proposed modification.
Although adding to the time period and required notices for the
attorney review condition increases the complexity of its exercise,
this added complexity could help to prevent a bad faith
termination of a contract and could lead to a signed contract being
carried out rather than terminated or ending up in litigation.
CONCLUSION
Adding an attorney approval clause to a residential real
estate contract is designed to achieve the twin goals of being able
to quickly sign up an interested buyer and seller to a deal that the
broker has helped the parties to reach, and being able to have an
attorney review the contract that the parties signed to make sure
that the client's objectives and needs are in fact being met through
the contract she entered into.'62 Unfortunately, the wording of
160. See supra note 45 (providing the full text of the attorney review clause
found in the Multi-Board Residential Real Estate Contract 3.0).
161. The clause should probably clarify that not only the modification, but
the disapproval cannot be based upon the purchase price.
162. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing how the primary
purpose of attorney approval clauses is to provide the public with the
opportunity to have an attorney review the contract so as to protect the client's
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some attorney approval clauses has impeded the latter goal by
providing an inadequate time period for the attorney to do the
review and by limiting the attorney to either approving or
disapproving the contract (i.e. limiting attorneys to being merely
problem spotters), rather than proposing modifications to the
contract (i.e. allowing attorneys to be problem solvers)."
Even more troubling, some court interpretations of attorney
approval clauses have also impeded the goal of competent attorney
representation of buyers and sellers by incorrectly interpreting
attorney approval clauses contained in a signed purchase and sale
agreement as "conditional acceptances" rather than as "conditional
contracts," and by characterizing any suggested changes to the
contracts as "counteroffers."" This misinterpretation of contract
principles creates an incentive for bad faith terminations of
contracts" and imposes a straight jacket on attorneys who would
like to be able to negotiate changes to a contract to resolve
problems that the contract poses for her client without
terminating the contract.'6 As previously discussed, if a court
construes the presence of an attorney approval clause to create a
conditional acceptance (as opposed to a conditional contract), then,
if an attorney proposes any changes to the contract under the
clause, this will be construed as a counter offer, even when the
proposal is clarified as mere suggestion. The other party can then
claim that there is no binding contract and 167no obligation to
approve or disapprove the contract in good faith.

objectives and needs).
163. In addition, some attorney approval clauses only allow an attorney to
modify the terms of the contract rather than disapprove the contract, which is
also too narrow a right in light of the purposes of the clause. See supra Part
III.A. (discussing how many typical attorney approval clauses contain
problematic wording that defeats the purpose for which those clauses were
inserted in the contract in the first place).
164. See supra Part III.B.1. (discussing the negative consequences of
mischaracterizing attorney approval clauses as conditional acceptances rather
than conditional contracts).
165. See supra Part III.B.l.b. (discussing the negative consequences of
concluding that the attorney review clause creates a conditional acceptance or
calling the communications made pursuant to the clause as a counteroffer
since the Olympic Restaurant decision).
166. See supra Part III.B.l.e. (arguing that the case law in Illinois on the
nature of attorney approval clauses is clearly divided and attorneys lack the
predictability they need in order to work with these clauses). Most troubling,
the majority of the reported decisions contain dicta that do not accurately
reflect the law, that create incentives for bad faith disapprovals, and that
prevent attorneys from competently and ethically doing their job. Id.
167. See supra Part III.B.l.c. (arguing that after Groshek, the
mischaracterization of suggested changes in the context of an attorney
approval clause as a counteroffer also encourages parties to use the
counteroffer dicta to terminate the contracts in bad faith).
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Court interpretations of attorney approvals have also fallen
short in terms of the handling of the "good faith" requirement. By
failing to require attorneys to specify a reason for the disapproval
at the time of its making, courts have facilitated bad faith
terminations.16 s This Article proposes that in defining good faith
exercise of the attorney approval, courts should require attorneys
to specify the reasons for a disapproval of the contract at the time
the disapproval is made. 9
In addition, in order to meet the
requirement of good faith, courts should require attorneys to
propose a modification to the contract rather than disapprove the
contract if a modification to the contract could address the
problems that the attorney detected with the contract or the
deal. "'
The test for whether the modification would adequately
address the problem should be based on whether the attorney and
her client in good faith believed that a modification to the contract
would not solve the problem identified by the attorney, rather than
requiring the attorney to satisfy a "reasonableness" test on this
issue.'
Courts are correct in not requiring attorneys to show that
their disapproval was "reasonable" because some attorneys are
better able to spot legitimate problems than others and because
clients have different levels of tolerance to risk and assign
different values to various contractual terms, making it counterproductive to apply an objective test to the disapproval."' Rather
than apply an objective test to combat bad faith terminations, this
Article proposes the requirement of specifying a reason for the
disapproval and the requirement to propose modifications when
feasible (again subject to a good faith test to determine if a
modification would address the client's concerns) as the better way
to prevent bad faith terminations. Requiring good faith should not
compromise an attorney's ability to competently and zealously
represent her client's legitimate interests."' In determining what
types of reasons for disapproval would be considered in good faith
and appropriate, courts should look to the framework that a
competent, well trained attorney would follow when representing a
buyer or seller of residential real estate as detailed in this

168. See supra Part III.B.2. (discussing how the courts' failure to adequately
define "good faith" and require an attorney to specify the reasons for
disapproval also encourage bad faith disapprovals).
169. See supra Part IV.A. (recommending to the courts how to properly
interpret attorney approval clauses).
170. Id.
171. Id. The reason for requiring only a good faith showing that the
modification would not adequately address the client's concerns is the same for
why a court should not require a showing of "reasonableness" for disapproval.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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article.14 When interpreting attorney approvals and the good faith
requirement, courts should keep the purpose of these clauses in
mind, as well as the transactional skills framework that attorneys
should be engaging in when operating under an attorney approval
clause.17A
Currently, attorneys are in a near impossible situation when
trying to correctly navigate through an attorney approval clause.
It is hoped that bar associations and brokerage associations will
revise the attorney approval clauses that they have prepared in
their standard form purchase and sale contracts in light of the
recommendations raised in this article. It is also hoped that
courts will adopt the recommendations raised in this article in
their future decisions, thereby creating a better judicial "North
Star" for attorneys to follow.

174. See supra Part II. (explaining what a competent and well trained
lawyer would do if representing a home buyer or home seller).
175. Id.

